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INTRODUCTION 
The pragmatics of privatization are terrain for a critical 
understanding of the relationship between government and business 
under the conditions associated with the globalization of neoliberal 
capitalism.1  Prison privatization is especially significant in this 
context, given the fact that—for privatization advocates and critics 
alike, in the United States and elsewhere—prisons represent a 
bellwether for broader questions about the scope of government.2  As 
John Donohue writes, “[f]ew roles in our American society seem more 
inherently ‘public’ than those of the police, the judges and the jailers.”3  
Given the traditional association of prisons with core governmental 
functions,4 prison privatization is strategically key to privatization 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Our usage of these terms is explained below.  As Leibling and Sparks have 
observed: “[T]he changing distribution of powers and responsibilities for the 
allocation or delivery of punishment and quasi-penal control (most obviously 
imprisonment and cognate forms of detention and segregation) between states and 
other actors cannot but be a matter of fundamental interest.” Alison Liebling & Richard 
Sparks, Editors’ Preface, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 283, 283 (2002). 
 2. For an extensive summary of policy and legal issues encountered in states’ 
prison privatization initiatives, see generally JUDITH HACKETT ET AL., THE COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOV’TS & THE URBAN INST., ISSUES IN CONTRACTING FOR THE PRIVATE OPERATION OF PRISONS AND 
JAILS (1987).  For comprehensive histories of prison privatization and critical accounts 
of current debates, see generally CAPITALIST PUNISHMENT: PRISON PRIVATIZATION & HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Andrew Coyle et al. eds., 2003); MICHAEL A. HALLETT, PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA: 
A CRITICAL RACE PERSPECTIVE (2006); PRIVATIZATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE (David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert eds., 2001); BERT USEEM & ANNE MORRISON 
PIEHL, PRISON STATE: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2008). 
 3. JOHN D. DONAHUE, PRISONS FOR PROFIT: PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE INTERESTS 3 (Econ. 
Policy Inst. ed. 1988). 
 4. This Article concerns the U.S. experience, but the British debates are to some 
extent parallel.  Regarding prison privatization, Sir Leon Radzinowicz has stated: 
[I]n a democracy grounded on the rule of law and public accountability the 
enforcement of penal legislation . . . should be the undiluted responsibility of 
the state.  It is one thing for private companies to provide services for the 
prison system but it is an altogether different matter for bodies whose 
motivation is primarily commercial to have coercive powers over prisoners. 
Elaine Genders, Legitimacy, Accountability and Private Prisons, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 
285, 289 (2002) (citation omitted).  Genders’s article concerns the private prison 
debate in the United Kingdom—a strong parallel involves incarceration as a 
constitutional preserve. See generally id.  Genders is critical of the idea of core 
governmental functions as an inherent obstacle to privatization, in that privatization—
as delegation by the executive—does not automatically remove imprisonment from 
the aegis of the state. See id. at 286.  The Supreme Courts of Israel and India have 
recently ruled private prisons unconstitutional. See Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), 
Privatization(s), Constitutionalization, and Statization: Icons and Experiences of 
Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 162, 162 (2013).  On Israeli debates 
over core governmental functions as limits to privatization, see generally Richard 
Harding, State Monopoly of ‘Permitted Violation of Human Rights’: The Decision of the 
Supreme Court of Israel Prohibiting the Private Operation and Management of Prisons, 
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proponents, as a test of the very notion of core government.5  Core 
government—implying a non-delegable “duty to govern”—is itself an 
issue in debate.6  The centrality of prison privatization to wider 
debates about privatization gives us our starting point in this Article.  
We agree with Frank Michelman’s assessment that privatization raises 
constitutional questions in a way that globalization does not, at least 
not automatically.7  Taken to an extreme, or in its most ideological 
form, one might imagine—with Michelman—that privatization makes 
government an “empty shell.”8  However, as Elaine Genders and others 
have noted, in the prison context, privatization does not automatically 
challenge the idea of core governmental functions since it does not 
automatically remove the state altogether from the process.9  Setting 
up contractual terms, standards, monitoring procedures, 
accountability, and conditions for rescission may all remain with the 
state.10 What, then, is the problem with prison privatization?  In what 
follows, rather than discuss this question in traditional binary terms—
public versus private, or more efficient versus less efficient—we read 
the private prison debate as a test of the government’s ability to 
mediate the public’s responsibility for the human conditions of 
citizenship.  This enables us to take a broader perspective on what is at 
stake in these debates, especially for the prisoners involved, when the 
state decides to privatize. 
                                                                                                                 
14 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 131 (2012).  On the constitutionality of privatization in the 
United States, see Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1367, 1437–39 (2003). 
 5. Charles H. Logan formulates the position in this way:  
The privatization of corrections, or punishment, is an especially significant 
part of the broader privatization movement.  By challenging the 
government’s monopoly over one of its ‘core’ functions, the idea directly 
threatens the assumption that certain activities are essentially and 
necessarily governmental . . . .  Thus, privatization in the area of criminal 
justice generally, and of imprisonment particularly, plays an important part 
in a broad, ideological debate over the proper scope and size of government. 
CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS: CONS & PROS 4 (1990). 
 6. “Domestic law scholars and policymakers have long debated the question of 
whether privatization undermines core public law values in the United States.” Laura 
A. Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING 
AND DEMOCRACY 335, 335 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).  On the “duty to 
govern,” see generally Paul Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT 
BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, supra, at 310. 
 7. See Frank I. Michelman, W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1063, 
1073 (2000). 
 8. See id. at 1065. 
 9. Genders, supra note 4, at 289–90. 
 10. See id. at 300; see also Alexander Volokh, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, 
and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L REV. 1868, 1870 (2002). 
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Our findings, thus, challenge assumptions that would situate prison 
privatization as a test of government’s scope.  For one thing, 
privatization itself is a form of governmental action, and may involve 
various forms of control on the part of the contracting agencies.11 More 
fundamentally for our purposes, the history we relate shows that 
privatization is not a unified phenomenon; prison privatization has a 
long and particular history that compels attention to diverse rationales 
and approaches.12  Moreover, that same history shows that prison 
privatization became a test of government’s scope only after a priority 
on limiting government was politicized and set in place as a matter of 
policy under the Reagan and Bush Administrations (and continued 
thereafter).  In relation to prisons, then, privatization should not be 
seen as a necessary response to a contemporary state of affairs, but a 
favored response, for reasons that predate the inmate explosion.13  
Accordingly, we suggest that the key factors usually credited with 
causing the demand for private prisons arguably include the effects of a 
neoliberalization of public administration already well under way by 
the early 1980s.  These are among the issues pursued in the following 
sections. 
The “privatization of prisons” is a phrase that refers to many 
spheres of activity that are contractually separate and, in some ways 
(as we shall see), conceptually distinct—as some involve direct 
substitution of private-for-public providers, whereas others involve 
                                                                                                                 
 11. “When private regulation is harnessed by public regulation, structures of 
private governance are embedded and integrated into a broader framework of public 
oversight.” Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVT’L & ADMIN. 
L. 291, 317 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12. On the diversity of privatization in relation to public law, see generally Laura A. 
Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383 (2006).  On 
public law values in privatization, see also Michelman, supra note 7, at 1073; see 
generally Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437 
(2005); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1285 (2003).  For analysis of democratic challenges, and human rights challenges, 
in prison privatization, see generally Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization and Democracy: 
Resources in Administrative Law, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND 
DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 261 [hereinafter Aman, Privatization and Democracy]; 
Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need to 
Extend the Province of Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 511 (2005) 
[hereinafter Aman, Democracy Deficits in the U.S.]; Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization and 
the Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through 
Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477 (2001).  On democracy deficit in 
globalization, see generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING 
GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004) [hereinafter AMAN, THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT]. 
 13. See NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION 
BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS (2014), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf. 
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reconfigurations of purposes and policies.  As areas of activity and 
related potential for reform—prison labor, prison services, prison 
construction, and management—may all involve quite distinct forms of 
enterprise.  In this Article, we emphasize the human side of prison 
privatization—that is, those aspects of private sector involvement that 
affect inmates directly, such as their health care, nutrition, living 
conditions, and, especially for purposes of this Article, their labor.  
Looking ahead to our conclusions, one implication of our analysis is 
that direct human services—such as those that affect the dignity of the 
person, the integrity of the body, and the value of personal labor—
should be treated differently by the law governing privatization.  In 
these areas, in which people may be irreparably harmed, additional 
safeguards are warranted, along with more public involvement, and 
more provision for public involvement at the initial contract 
negotiation stages as well as rescission.  Direct human vulnerability 
mandates more direct forms of public participation than those more 
impersonal domains of government contracts dealing with, for 
example, the construction of roads or bridges, and routine service 
contracts in which expenses and revenues may be more definitive.  It is 
in this respect—namely, the human dimensions of prison contracts—
that prison privatization may be more appropriately considered a 
bellwether for the provision of basic services, not just to inmates in 
public prisons, but also to other populations made vulnerable by 
confinement or other constraints, including labor precarity (structural 
underemployment), persistent poverty, chronic illness, or immigrant 
status. 
Our aim, therefore, is to reexamine some of the key terms of 
discussion surrounding prison privatization.  We propose a resetting of 
those terms in three respects.  First, we argue that the context of 
prison privatization should include the privatization movement and its 
relevance to the globalization of capital in the 1970s (and continuing 
today).  Second, resetting the context in this way lengthens the modern 
history of prison privatization from its conventional starting point in 
the prison-overcrowding crisis of the late 1980s and 1990s,14 to show 
its emergence at least a decade earlier, as part of the broader 
movement to privatization in state and federal government.  Seen from 
that longer perspective, prison privatization is integral to privatization 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-91-21, PRIVATE PRISONS: COST SAVINGS 
AND BOP’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY NEED TO BE RESOLVED 8–12 (1991), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150187.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-
90-1BR,  PRISON CROWDING: ISSUES FACING THE NATION’S PRISON SYSTEMS 4–5 (1989), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/77582.pdf. 
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in other sectors, and, in turn, to the neoliberalization of government 
and global markets.  The longer view also leaves room for an account 
of prison privatization that considers aspects of privatization affecting 
the prison sector in addition to prison privatization per se.  In this 
Article, we discuss prison labor as a key element of that larger picture. 
Thus, third, we turn to prison labor.  We discuss two federal 
initiatives that involved the private sector in corrections well prior to 
prison privatization.  Both of these involved prison labor, though under 
substantially different models, and with different aims.  These 
initiatives—their similarities as well as their differences—shed light 
on the privatization of prison labor as a crucial through-line of reform 
from the 1970s, and even earlier, through the present day.  The more 
complete chronology that we advocate is rooted to debates—within 
government and between business and labor—about prison labor as a 
sector of the national and global work force.  Issues related to inmate 
labor are relevant to the analysis of prison privatization as well as to 
the potential for improving this aspect of our justice system through 
law.  In particular, they make visible the wider situation of those who 
labor in the current “post-Fordist” era outside of the prison walls.15  
We argue for acknowledging inmate labor as labor, as a fresh starting 
point for debates currently defined by the polarity of punishment and 
rehabilitation.  Revising the terms of discussion in these three ways 
(resetting context, lengthening the chronology, and focusing on the 
privatization of labor) improves one’s understanding of the 
development of prison privatization in relation to other aspects of the 
                                                                                                                 
 15. “Post-Fordism” refers to a periodization of capitalism that, since the 1970s, has 
put a premium on flexibility—i.e., maximizing the mobility of capital for purposes of 
strategic investment and offloading of risk—as a key to successful competition in the 
global economy.  In contrast to Fordism (the mass production of the assembly line), 
post-Fordist enterprises retain their capacity for “flexible [capital] accumulation” by 
developing “flexible labor markets and geographies of production”—i.e., moving 
production to locations where labor and supplies can be found at minimal cost, and 
setting labor conditions such that workers themselves absorb the risks of fluctuating 
demand (by cyclical unemployment or suppressed wages).  While the specifics of such 
periodization (including its causes and effects) are issues of debate, we use the term as 
a general reference to the historical conditions that made “heightened competition, 
entrepreneurialism and neo-conservatism” central to the social organization of the 
economy in the United States.  On post-Fordism as flexible accumulation, labor 
markets and geographies, see ASH AMIN, Post-Fordism: Models, Fantasies and Phantoms 
of Transition, in POST-FORDISM: A READER 1, 6 (Ash Amin ed., 1994).  On post-Fordism as 
heightened competition, entrepreneurialism, and neo-conservativism, see DAVID 
HARVEY, THE URBAN EXPERIENCE 13 (1989).  On “post-Fordist corrections,” see DARIO 
MELOSSI, CONTROLLING CRIME, CONTROLLING SOCIETY: THINKING ABOUT CRIME IN EUROPE AND 
AMERICA 237–41 (2008). 
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relationship between government and business under conditions of 
globalization. 
Our analysis proceeds in three main steps, each one providing the 
theme of one of the Article’s three main Parts.  Part I provides 
background by filling in the relevant connections between the 
globalization of capital and privatization in the United States—
resetting the privatized prison context and lengthening its timeline, as 
mentioned above.16  We emphasize the modern origins of prison 
privatization—that is, prison privatization since the 1970s—in the 
larger privatization movement.  In the first sections of Part I, we argue 
that the context of modern prison privatization is appropriately placed 
in the economic restructuring associated with the globalization of 
neoliberal capitalism.  The reforms associated with privatization are 
not just illustrative of a swing of the regulatory pendulum from liberal 
to conservative; rather, they represent a fundamental shift in the 
governing role now played by the state in this age of globalization.17  
Appreciating the connections between globalization and privatization 
is thus key to the rest of the discussion, as prison privatization 
emerges as a domestic “face” of globalization.18 
In the second part of Part I, we pursue those connections more 
specifically in relation to prison privatization.  Most discussions of 
prison privatization in the United States—among politicians, 
academics, and advocates alike—take as a given the development of 
                                                                                                                 
 16. For additional background to legislative, executive, and judicial responses to 
globalization at the federal level, see ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL 
ERA 125–30 (1992) [hereinafter AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA]; ALFRED C. 
AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 124–27; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., 
Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the 
Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1193–1201 (1988) [hereinafter 
Aman, Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency]; 
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative 
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1697–1700 (2002); see also CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, THE 
PARADOX OF RELEVANCE: ETHNOGRAPHY AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 52 (2011).  
Aman has dubbed these trends as indicative of  “the global age” of regulatory reform, 
carried out by a “globalizing state.”  Greenhouse has tracked the political 
mainstreaming of an approach to social policy that favored marketization as a 
regulatory mechanism in the 1980s and 1990s.  See generally GREENHOUSE, supra. 
 17. For discussion of the “globalizing state” and the “global era” of administrative 
law, see AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 16; Aman, Progress, 
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, supra note 16. 
 18. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization from the Ground up: a Domestic Perspective, 
in THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE UNITED STATES: LAW AND GOVERNANCE 5–17 
(Beverley Crawford et al. eds., 2008); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Private Prisons and the 
Democratic Deficit, in PRIVATE SECURITY, PUBLIC ORDER: THE OUTSOURCING OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
AND ITS LIMITS 87  (Simon Chesterman & Angelina Fisher eds., 2009); see also, AMAN, THE 
DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 7, 101–105. 
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prison privatization as a cost-efficient solution to the interrelated 
problems of prison population explosion and taxpayer resistance to 
expanding government budgets.19  These are important factors, but we 
suggest that additional sources of the various forms of prison 
privatization lie elsewhere.  We emphasize the early years of the 
prison privatization movement, as various paths for reforming an 
outmoded system eventually drew the attention of every branch of the 
federal government, many states, various business sectors, and other 
organizations in the United States.  These early efforts focused on 
prison labor as a primary site of private sector involvement.20 
In Part II, we turn to two major prison privatization initiatives, both 
of which involved key actors within the federal government, and both 
of which predate the prison-crowding crisis of the late 1980s.  We 
compare these initiatives as distinct models of privatization, noting the 
federal uptake of the privatization movement’s emphasis on reforming 
the financialization of government, as this was applied to the prison 
sector.21  Taking these early initiatives into account, we argue that the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See infra Part II.  For examples especially relevant to policy issues affecting 
prison privatization, see generally GAIL S. FUNKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR INNOVATIONS IN 
CORRECTIONS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRISON INDUSTRIES: DISCUSSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Gaile S. Funke ed., 1986), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/102295NCJRS.pdf; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N 
ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1988), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABB472.pdf; Prison Privatization, CORRECTIONS 
PROJECT, http://www.correctionsproject.com/corrections/pris_priv.htm (last visited 
June 27, 2014).  For a different starting point, cast in terms of the rise of managerialism 
and a concomitant policy shift toward punishment, see DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF 
CONTROL 105–06 (2001). 
 20. By prison labor, we refer to the paid work of inmates.  Prison staff salaries are 
relevant to a larger discussion of prison finances and potential cost efficiencies; 
however, that is not our purpose in this Article.  On prison staff salaries as a factor in 
assessments of prison privatization, see JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS iii (2001), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf.  In 1995, as privatization advocates 
in Congress and elsewhere pressed to increase privatization, the growth of staff 
salaries and expanding expenditure for salaries represented the largest source of the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons’ growth in expenditures. Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns 
and Challenges for the Future: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 3 (1995) (statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, 
Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/106064.pdf [hereinafter Bureau of Prisons: Recent 
Concerns]. 
 21. By “financialization,” we refer to an administrative priority on converting 
capital into marketable financial assets so as to maximize opportunities for profit 
and/or minimize fixed costs.  In the prison sector, for example, privatization advocates 
argued for broadening the role of the private sector in prison construction and 
management both to support efficiency and as a means of freeing up government 
assets for other uses with more growth potential. See SENTENCING PROJECT, PRISON 
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more convincing chronology for prison privatization would start the 
story in the modern efforts to privatize prison labor—specifically in 
relation to Federal Prison Industries in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
Congress’s creation of the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification 
Program (PIECP) in 1979.22  We review these developments, 
emphasizing their similarities and differences as privatization 
initiatives, and linking on-going debates about prison labor 
(particularly regarding minimum wage and the role of organized 
labor) to the global economic situation.  The focus on labor yields a 
more appropriate context for approaching prison privatization as part 
of the economic restructuring and deregulatory trends associated with 
globalization.23 
In Part III, we consider the implications of rethinking prison 
privatization in relation to the privatization trends of the 1970s and 
1980s.  Most importantly, attention to prison labor underscores the 
relevance of social conditions beyond prisons to the social conditions 
of the prison itself—in particular, as breadwinners, family members, 
community members, and, more generally, the “civil rights landscape” 
of citizenship.24  Thus, the revision of chronology established in Parts I 
                                                                                                                 
PRIVATIZATION AND THE USE OF INCARCERATION (2004), available at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_prisonprivatization.pdf 
(discussing and critiquing the efficiency argument raised by advocates of 
privatization). 
 22. PIECP was established under the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. 
L. No. 96-157, § 827, 93 Stat. 1167, 1215.  Federal Prison Industries (FPI) was 
established in 1934 by Pub. L. No. 73-461, 48 Stat. 1211 and Exec. Order No. 6917, and 
was reauthorized in 1948 by the 1948 Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 851 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4121, 4122).  Since 1977, FPI has been known by the trade-name 
“UNICOR.” See UNICOR, FACTORIES WITH FENCES: 75 YEARS OF CHANGING LIVES 24 (2009), 
available at 
https://www.unicor.gov/information/publications/pdfs/corporate/CATMC1101_C.pd
f. 
 23. On prison privatization as integral to economic restructuring in globalization, 
see Rebecca M. McLennan, The New Penal State: Globalization, History, and American 
Criminal Justice, 2 INTER-ASIA CULTURAL STUD. 407, 408 (2001) [hereinafter McLennan, 
The New Penal State].  In this Article, we do not address the long history of prison labor 
in the United States prior to the privatization movements of the 1970s and 1980s, 
although it remains relevant to debates, then and now, as the object of reform.  For 
detailed accounts, see REBECCA M. MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT: PROTEST, 
POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN PENAL STATE, 1776–1941, at 87–192 (2008) 
[hereinafter MCLENNAN, THE CRISIS OF IMPRISONMENT], on the history of partnerships 
between business and prison agencies, and various prison labor regimes, particularly 
those involving contracts and leased labor. 
 24. On citizenship as the “more encompassing” rubric for discussion of prison 
reform (relative to rights claims), see Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Rights Without 
Citizenship: Activist Politics And Prison Reform In The United States, in ROUTING THE 
OPPOSITION—SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLIC POLICY AND DEMOCRACY 236–37 (David S. Meyer et 
al. eds., 2005) (arguing for restoring the franchise to inmates); see also Mary Fainsod 
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and II gives more prominence to prison labor as integral to wider 
trends affecting domestic labor markets under pressure from global 
competition.  Acknowledging the wider context of prison privatization 
clarifies the scope and substance of regulation, and the potential for 
improvements through law and law reform, including but not limited 
to issues of contracting.  In Part III, we conclude our analysis in these 
terms and apply our findings regarding prison privatization to 
potential areas of improvement through law.  Our aim is to contribute 
to the private prison debate by shifting the terms of debate from the 
financialization of government to the status of labor.  Doing so widens 
the scope for thinking of prisoners not as revenue streams, but as 
beneficiaries of the corrections system and as members of 
communities beyond prison walls, even while incarcerated.25  In this 
regard, Mary Katzenstein suggests that “prisons as institutions can 
serve as a mirror refracting the values and politics of a nation.”26  To 
Katzenstein’s observation, we would only add the global context that 
affects the status of labor, even within the walls of U.S. prisons. 
I.  PRISON PRIVATIZATION AS A DOMESTIC FACE OF GLOBALIZATION 
Prison privatization refers to a broad array of privatized 
construction, management, services, and inmate programming.  Each 
of these areas is a piece of a much larger picture of the privatization of 
government functions in the United States.  As such, prison 
privatization is part of a broader regulatory phenomenon 
characteristic of globalization.  In this Part, we discuss privatization as 
a feature of globalization, before returning to issues raised by prison 
privatization. 
For purposes of this Article, we take globalization—a term in wide 
and diffuse usage—to refer to myriad measures aimed at accelerating 
the flow of capital and maximizing competitive opportunities for 
accumulation.27  In this Article, we refer to neoliberal globalization, and 
                                                                                                                 
Katzenstein et al., The Dark Side of American Liberalism, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 1035, 1039–45 
(2010). 
 25. On prison reforms and programs that cross prison walls in this way, see 
Michelle Brown, Of Prisons, Gardens, and the Way Out, 64 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL 
ISSUE) 67, 82–83 (2014); Rebecca Ginsburg, Knowing That We Are Making a Difference: 
A Case For Critical Prison Programming, 64 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 33 
(2014); Doran Larson, Introduction, 64 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2014); see 
also UNICOR, supra note 22, at 9. 
 26. Katzenstein et al., supra note 24, at 1036. 
 27. For general background on neoliberalization as a “distinctive form of 
globalization” (in Harvey’s phrase), see DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 
152–72 (2005).  Harvey defines “neoliberalism” as: 
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sometimes to neoliberalization—signaling a now-pervasive capitalist 
culture predicated on disembedding the market from government, 
including maximum marketization of government services.28 
A. The Global Context: Privatization and Neoliberalization 
In the United States, privatization should be understood as both a 
driving and principal effect of globalization.29  The increasing reliance 
on marketized forms of administration and corporate self-regulation in 
lieu of regulation by government is commonly referred to as “the new 
                                                                                                                 
[A] theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-
being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms 
and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade.  The role of the [neoliberal] 
state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such 
practices. 
Id. at 2.  In this Article, our concern with neoliberal globalization is primarily with 
governmental and non-governmental interventions aimed at maximizing access to 
capital markets and trade—acknowledging the asymmetries of power and influence 
that enter into the establishment of global trade conditions and its selective benefits.  
For a classic analysis of globalization in these terms, see generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Law, Markets and 
Democracy: A Role for Law in the Neo-Liberal State, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 801 (2006-
2007). 
 28. “There has everywhere been an emphatic turn towards neoliberalism in 
political-economic practices and thinking since the 1970s.” HARVEY, supra note 27, at 2.  
With respect to private prisons, Martha Minow writes: “[F]or-profit prisons . . . are 
simply part of a larger pattern . . . .  A sea change is at work . . . .  Private and market-
style mechanisms are increasingly employed to provide what government had taken as 
duties.” MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 2–3 
(2002).  But the pervasiveness of neoliberalism does not imply a homogeneity of 
experience within neoliberalism.  For a critique of “convergence narratives” of 
globalization from African perspectives, see JAMES FERGUSON, GLOBAL SHADOWS: AFRICA IN 
THE NEOLIBERAL WORLD ORDER 28–29 (2006).  For Asian perspectives, see generally 
AIHWA ONG, NEOLIBERALISM AS EXCEPTION: MUTATIONS IN CITIZENSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY (2006).  
For a discussion of alternatives to neoliberal globalization from diverse critical 
standpoints situated in the global south, see generally LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM 
BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A. 
Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005).  The importance of specificity is not limited to national 
or regional experience; it is also relevant in the analysis of domestic policy fields.  For a 
discussion of neoliberalism and welfare administration reform, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., 
Globalization and the Privatization of Welfare Administration in Indiana, 20 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 377, 377–78 (2013) (discussing Karl Polanyi and various ways in 
which markets can be re-embedded into society). 
 29. “Governing by contract in the United States today should be understood as 
integral to the processes, both political and economic, that made privatization a major 
domestic response to as well as driver of globalization.” Aman, Privatization and 
Democracy, supra note 12, at 261. 
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governance.”30  The new governance is indicative of recent 
transformations in the relationship between the market and the state 
itself—transformations that are inseparable from global economic 
competition and other forms of interdependence between state and 
non-state actors, domestically and transnationally, as these have 
developed in recent decades.31 
Neoliberalization of government in the United States puts a political 
premium on the financialization of public administration, government 
services, and other government functions, in turn lending rhetorical 
heft to two principal distinctions: between the public and private 
sectors, and, correspondingly, between law and markets as regulatory 
tools.32  The realities of financing government are far more complex 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See LESTER M. SALAMON, THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 
vii (2002).  “The new governance” is Salamon’s term for an approach to problem 
solving in the public sphere.  It refers to an analytical 
[F]ramework [emphasizing] the collaborative nature of modern efforts to 
meet human needs, the widespread use of tools of action that engage complex 
networks of public and private actors, and the resulting need for a different 
style of public management, and a different type of public sector, 
emphasizing collaboration and enablement rather than hierarchy and 
control. 
Id. 
 31. On transformations of the public sphere, see Ali Farazmand, Globalization, 
Privatization and the Future of Modern Governance: A Critical Assessment, 2 PUB. FIN. 
MGMT. 151, 152 (2002) (“With sweeping privatization of public enterprises and other 
major governmental functions, the capacity and ability of governments in public 
management are seriously diminished even as challenges and crises multiply in both 
number and intensity.  Globalization has not ended the state and public administration, 
but it has caused a major qualitative change and alteration in the nature, character, and 
role of the state and public management; in fact, state continuity persists because it is 
instrumental to the functioning of capitalism.”).  On transformations in private life, see 
CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, Introduction, in ETHNOGRAPHIES OF NEOLIBERALISM 3 (2010) (“In its 
valorization of the individual, its preference for markets over rights as the basis for 
social reform, and its withdrawal of the state from the service sector, neoliberalism 
overwrites older notions of the public based in organic solidarity with a strong 
mechanical overlay – as an improvement, or modernization, of more traditional social 
bonds.  Understanding this inversion is crucial to understanding the nature of the 
interpretive questions to which neoliberalism gives rise in everyday life, since 
neoliberal reform reshapes the relationship between society and the state without 
eliminating what came before.”).  For the impact of neoliberalization on the crime 
policy and practice in recent decades, see GARLAND, supra note 19, at 105–06. 
 32. On the connections between the politics and rhetoric in the neoliberalization of 
the federal government in the United States, see GREENHOUSE, supra note 16, at 76, 231.  
On the dilemmas of the public/private distinction as related to globalization, see 
SALAMON, supra note 30, at vii.  On the distinction between state law and markets as 
sources of regulation, see COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEO-LIBERALISM 24–
48 (2011); Farazmand, supra note 31, at 152.  Michelman notes the binary ideological 
distinction between these terms among some proponents and critics of privatization, 
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than these rhetorical distinctions imply.  Whereas the rhetoric implies 
complementarity (more private sector equals less government, for 
example), the diverse complexity of the state’s roles in privatization, as 
well as the variety of businesses and business models involved, defy 
neat boundaries.33  To the extent that maximizing the financialization 
of government through privatization entails deregulation or 
outsourcing, one should keep in mind the fact that these tools for 
minimizing government (as the rhetoric implicitly claims) actually 
extend government into new areas of the private sector, through 
contracts, monitoring, and other means.34  A relevant example is prison 
privatization, which at its inception had already involved a complex 
cooperative arrangement between government and business, 
developed over the course of years.35 
Privatization by contract became politically popular in the United 
States as an approach to the governmental provision of social services, 
especially for the poor, for immigrants, and for prisoners—i.e., 
dependent populations whose situations expose them extensively to 
managed care of various kinds.36  Such marketization became a sort of 
political common sense as electorates, led by politicians and advocacy 
groups, became aware of global economic competition in the 1980s 
and 1990s.37  Municipal, state, and federal contracts with private 
providers are not new in the United States, but—as in the prison 
                                                                                                                 
in contrast to the pragmatic impossibility of neatly separating them as actions or 
effects. See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1080. 
 33. See Farazmand, supra note 31, at 153; Genders, supra note 4, at 286–87. See 
generally GARLAND, supra note 19. 
 34. On the expansion of the state’s role in relation to the privatization of prisons 
and prison alternatives in the United States, see Malcolm Feeley, Entrepreneurs of 
Punishment: The Legacy of Privatization, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 321, 322–23 (2002).  For 
a discussion of how deregulation results in a new form of regulation, see AMAN, THE 
DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 48–53. 
 35. On the development of cooperation between government and business in the 
prison sector, see DONNA SELMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, PUNISHMENT FOR SALE: PRIVATE PRISONS, 
BIG BUSINESS, AND THE INCARCERATION BINGE 77–104 (2010). See also KATHERINE BECKETT, 
MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS, 100–01 (1997); 
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL 
ORDER 233–39 (2011). See generally DONAHUE, supra note 3; Mona Lynch, Selling 
‘Securityware’: Transformations in Prison Commodities Advertising, 1949–1999, 4 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y, 305 (2002). 
 36. Martin Sellers refers to the public “production” of prisons—distinguishing 
between production (which may be public or private, or both) and provision (which is 
governmental). MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 16–17, 33–36 (1993). 
 37. On the relevance of global economic competition to Congressional debates over 
immigration, welfare, and civil rights, see GREENHOUSE, supra note 16, at 74. 
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context—such contracts were now put to new ends, with the 
government as both contractor and client. 
Federal and state commitments to privatization are integral to the 
neoliberalization of global capital, even when the relevant activities are 
located entirely within the domestic territory of the United States.38  
Understanding domestic privatization in global terms clarifies the 
scope for law in relation to privatization—though we do not suggest 
that law alone (for example, in the form of legislation or contracts) will 
offer solutions to all the problems that currently encumber the systems 
of corrections in the United States.39  It also introduces fresh 
perspectives on the situation of imprisoned people beyond their status 
as inmates (e.g., as wage earners, family members, citizens, and so 
forth).  Moreover, it highlights a potentially significant role for political 
engagement involving diverse stakeholder communities—including 
inmates’ families and communities.40 
The advantage of understanding globalization’s “domestic face”—
i.e., its embeddedness in the local—is the light shed on the major roles 
local actors and institutions can potentially play when it comes to 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See GARLAND, supra note 19, at 127, 131–32 (discussing privatization and 
globalization as the context for transformations in the penal field in Great Britain and 
the United States). 
 39. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 40. To the extent that the public has been involved in such decisions, the question 
has been framed around taxation and public expense.  Commentators note that state 
and local prison construction has been constrained by voters’ rejections of general 
bond issues. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.  Michael Hallett notes that this is 
not the only means available to governors and local executives for raising revenues for 
new projects such as prison construction; lease-payment bonds are an alternative 
means, not subject to a referendum. See Michael Hallett, Race, Crime, and for Profit 
Imprisonment: Social Disorganization as Market Opportunity, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y, 369, 
375–76 (2002) (noting lease-payment bonds are an alternative to public bonds, not 
subject to a referendum, available to governors and local executives for raising 
revenues for new projects such as prison construction).  To our knowledge, the public 
has not been effectively involved in questions on the other side of the coin, in 
particular, questions arising from the fact of profit-making corporations performing 
the day-to-day functions of government.  In the conclusions, we argue for broader 
public engagement on such questions, which vary with the different settings in which 
they arise.  For example, privatizing a prison is very different than entering into a 
contract for the construction and maintenance of buildings, bridges or roads.  Thus, 
distinguishing between what is public, and what is private, is highly contingent on the 
extent to which the interests of government, the private sector, and specific political 
communities (voters and others) align.  We leave this point, for now, as a 
terminological note: throughout, we refer to government and firms—rather than 
public and private producers—to avoid prejudging the extent to which public and 
private values and interests are commensurable in any given situation. 
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creating a more humane conception of globalization and its practices.41  
This in turn draws attention to the role of contracts in the privatization 
process, and their potential for introducing more specificity, 
transparency, and accountability into what is otherwise treated as 
atypical government contracts dealing, for example, with bridge or 
road construction.42  The human emergency that by definition 
accompanies imprisonment makes these issues vivid and urgent. 
The idea that globalization and domestic law are interrelated in the 
private prison context may seem counter-intuitive, given that criminal 
law enforcement is traditionally considered a domestic function.  The 
recent history of prison privatization, however, is fascinating precisely 
because it reveals how fundamental questions, such as the significance 
of territoriality, the scope of government, and other such basic matters 
actually are undecided at any given point in time. 
Appreciating privatization as integral to globalization fosters a 
multi-centered approach to reform, open to multiple institutions and 
communities.  As we review policy paths taken and not taken in the 
discussion below, our concern is not to endorse or condemn any 
particular approach, but to highlight the contemporary complexity of 
the question of how government defines its beneficiaries.  Looking 
ahead in that spirit, one role for law might be in the development of 
infrastructures for reforms—e.g., contributing to the development of 
new forums for deliberation and stakeholder participation in relation 
to decisions not only regarding whether to outsource, but also how and 
with whom.  Another role might be in forging channels across policy 
domains, as a corrective to the politicization of rhetoric, and the gap 
between rhetoric and pragmatic effects, both of which occur more 
easily when contentious issues are left in isolation.  In this regard, 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See Aman, Democracy Deficits in the U.S., supra note 12, at 7; see also SASKIA 
SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 1 (2006) 
(“The epochal transformation we call globalization is taking place inside the national to 
a far larger extent than is usually recognized.  It is here that the most complex 
meanings of the global are being constituted . . . .”). 
 42. For a detailed and critical analysis of the contracting process in the context of 
prison health care, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., An Administrative Law Perspective on 
Government Social Service Contracts: Outsourcing Prison Health Care in New York City, 
14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 301, 304 (2007) (“The least-bid government contract has 
its variants, such as those that provide governments some discretion when social 
services are involved.  Such approaches, however, remain focused primarily on cost 
and an open bidding procedure.  They may be appropriate for infrastructrue projects 
such as roads, bridges, or public buildings, or services such as building cleaning, copy 
machine repair, or even food services.  But they take on a negatively transformative 
effect when applied to more fundamental human needs such as health.”). 
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labor may be seen as a major connection between the prison world and 
the world outside of prisons. 
B. Privatization, Outsourcing, Deregulation, and Globalization: A 
Historical Perspective 
In the United States, privatization usually means some form of 
outsourcing, that is, the contracting out of some or all of an 
administrative agency’s regulatory responsibilities to a private firm.43  
The primary governance tool in privatization is the contract.44  The 
management of prisons has been increasingly outsourced to the 
private sector at both the federal and state levels since its inception in 
the late 1980s and 1990s.45 
Privatization of government by contracting out, or outsourcing, has 
been a trend since the 1980s and through the 1990s—actively 
promoted by the Reason Foundation,46 and the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations, embraced by the Clinton Administration, and 
accelerated by President George W. Bush’s directive, the President’s 
Management Agenda 2003, mandating all federal agencies to privatize 
                                                                                                                 
 43. U.S. privatization has occurred primarily in the form of outsourcing; 
elsewhere—in the United Kingdom and other countries where utilities and other 
services such as transportation are state-owned—privatization has involved the sale of 
government assets.  Mathew Blum proposes a distinction between privatization (as 
sale), out-sourcing (as contract), and competitive sourcing (as a tool that is neutral as 
between privatization and out-sourcing). See Mathew Blum, The Federal Framework 
for Competing Commercial Work between Public and Private Sectors, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 64.  In the context of this Article, 
privatization of prisons largely takes the form of outsourcing, often with a competitive 
sourcing rationale. 
 44. Federal contracts with private firms are covered by the Service Contract Act of 
1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 351–58 (2006), and the Procurement Integrity Act, 41 U.S.C. § 423 
(2006).  Specific authority to contract for private prisons has been the subject of 
debate over the years.  In its 1988 report, the President’s Commission on Privatization 
found authority for prison privatization in the Attorney General’s discretion regarding 
the means of detaining prisoners. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 19, at 
147; see 18 U.S.C. § 4082(a) (1988); Pub. L. No. 89-176, 79 Stat. 674 (1965) (amending 
§ 4082). However, in 1991, and reiterated in 1995, the U.S. General Accounting Office 
felt this authority was insufficient, and recommended that Congress give the Bureau of 
Prisons explicit authority to “conduct and evaluate a pilot test of federal prison 
privatization.” Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 1. 
 45. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 3. 
 46. See REASON FOUND., ANNUAL PRIVATIZATION REPORT: TRANSFORMING GOVERNMENT 
THROUGH PRIVATIZATION 1–2 (2006), available at 
http://reason.org/files/d767317fa4806296191436e95f68082a.pdf.  SourceWatch 
attributes the Reason Foundation’s position on privatization to the influence of George 
C. Zoley, CEO of GEO Group. See George C. Zoley, SOURCEWATCH, 
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/George_C._Zoley. 
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administrative services to the maximum extent possible.47  State 
legislatures have similarly mandated administrative reviews of 
operations and, in some cases, assets, to assess the potential for 
conversions to private ownership or management.48 The Obama 
Administration has sought to reverse the trend towards offshore 
outsourcing by various means, including significant tax relief for firms 
that relocate to the territorial United States;49 however, privatization 
through outsourcing remains a feature of government operations.  
Privatization is one of the primary mechanisms governments have for 
aligning the financialization of government with neoliberalization of 
the global economy.50  In this section, we explain in broad terms how 
that alignment works. 
                                                                                                                 
 47. See FED. ACQUISITION COUNCIL, MANAGER’S GUIDE TO COMPETITIVE SOURCING 16–22 (2d 
ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/procurement_guides/fac
_manager_guide.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMPETITIVE 
SOURCING: REPORT ON THE USE OF BEST VALUE TRADEOFFS IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION 2–5 
(2006), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/procurement/comp_src/cs_best_value_report_2006.pdf
; 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMPETITIVE SOURCING: 
CONDUCTING PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION IN A REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE MANNER 1 (2003), 
available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/comp_sourcing_0
72403.pdf; REASON FOUND., supra note 46, at 7, 23; REASON PUB. POLICY INST., 
PRIVATIZATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON CONTRACTING, PRIVATIZATION, AND GOVERNMENT 
REFORM 1–4 (1997). 
 48. See REASON FOUND., supra note 46, at 55–60; Robert D. Boerner, Privatization of 
State Government Services, NAT’L CONG. ST. LEGISLATURES LEGISBRIEFS, Jan. 1998. See 
generally KIMBERLY BANDY & STEPHEN GRIMES, PRIVATE CONTRACTS, PUBLIC SERVICES: WEIGHING 
THE CHOICES (1995), available at 
http://www.comptroller.tn.gov/Repository/RE/private.pdf. 
 49. See Administration Support For Insourcing and Increasing Investment in the 
United States, WHITE HOUSE 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/1_10_2012_fact_sheet_on_past_suppo
rt_for_insourcing_final_2.pdf (last visited Aug. 13, 2014). 
 50. Thus, William Novak relates privatization to larger policy trends, referring to 
the turn to privatization [as] the tendency of policymakers to increasingly 
rely on the private sector, through out-sourcing, contracting, disinvestment, 
and the selling and leasing of governmental properties and resources, to meet 
obligations formerly thought of as distinctly public.  Part of a larger set of 
neoliberal policy shifts that includes deregulation and an increased reliance 
on market mechanisms, this preference for exploring private over public 
solutions has permeated current policy issues ranging from international 
security and prisons to welfare and public health to highways and public 
parks. 
William Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 23; see also Michelman, supra 
note 7, at 1063 (“‘Privatization’ [refers to] . . . roughly, a shift toward provision by 
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When privatization takes the form of outsourcing, it is also a form of 
deregulation.  Deregulation in the form of outsourcing is one of the 
predominant modes of domestic regulatory reform today, such that 
private firms now provide many services once provided by 
governments.51 Privatization and its close cousin, deregulation, are the 
hallmarks of U.S. regulation, in what author Alfred Aman has called the 
era of globalization.52 
Early signs of the global era were the attempts to substitute market-
oriented rules for New Deal-like regulatory regimes that began as early 
as the Carter Administration53 and accelerated greatly under the 
Reagan and Bush Administrations in the 1980s.  The nature of this 
process is perhaps best exemplified by the reforms that occurred at the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) at that time.54  
Throughout the 1980s, the FCC recalibrated its regulatory approaches 
to replace New Deal regulatory actions with more market-oriented 
                                                                                                                 
nongovernmental organizations of certain classes of goods and services, or 
performance by those organizations of certain classes of functions, for the provision or 
performance of which we’ve been accustomed to relying exclusively or mainly on 
government offices and agencies.”). 
 51. See PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn 
eds., 2014).  Privatization as it is practiced in the United States can sometimes result in 
a complete form of deregulation, as when Congress deregulated the price of oil at the 
wellhead.  But deregulation can also include outsourcing since this approach seeks to 
substitute private actors and firms for government employees and administrative 
agencies.  For a detailed discussion of deregulation and the ways that administrative 
agencies responded to and shaped the global era of regulation, see AMAN, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra, note 16, at 47–53; Aman, Progress, 
Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, supra note 16, at 
1153–64. 
 52. See PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 51.  Viewed through the 
lens of the history of regulation in the United States, neoliberalization as an approach 
to globalization may be seen as a successor to earlier eras marked by their own iconic 
regulatory trends—the natural monopoly regulation of the New Deal era, and the 
tragedy of the commons that so absorbed regulators during the Environmental Era.  
But any such comparisons also highlight key differences.  One difference is the role of 
Congress—much less direct now than it was when the reforms of the New Deal and the 
Environmental Era were put in place.  Both of those eras were typified by major 
legislation passed by Congress, whereas today’s deregulatory reforms and their 
calibrations come primarily through administrative agencies and presidential 
executive orders. See Aman, Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the 
Administrative Presidency, supra note 16, at 1108–41 (providing a detailed history of 
these regulatory periods); see also AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra, 
note 16, at 42–43. 
 53. See AMAN, THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT, supra note 12, at 93; Alfred C. Aman, Jr., 
Deregulation in the United States: Transition to the Promised Land, A New Regulatory 
Paradigm, or Back to the Future?, in THE LIBERALIZATION OF STATE MONOPOLIES IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 267 (Damien Geradin ed., 2000). 
 54. AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 16, at 53–62. 
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rules.  For the most part, courts allowed this, recognizing that the 
broad public interest language of New Deal statutes such as the 
Communications Act of 1934 allowed the agency the flexibility to 
substitute a new conception of what the public’s interest required, 
especially in light of changes in the structure and competitive capacity 
of the industries involved.55 
Environmental regulation reform followed a somewhat similar 
regulatory reform path, as market regulatory approaches gradually 
replaced so-called command and control rules.56  Once again, though 
the statutes involved were not as open-ended as New Deal legislation, 
there was enough interpretive room in many cases to introduce 
market means toward regulatory ends.  There were limits to this 
approach,57 but for the most part agencies themselves did most of the 
deregulating involved.  The New Deal regulation of markets in the 
public interest left as part of its legacy a discourse in which 
deregulation in today’s different economic circumstances is now 
similarly justified by some as if it were a corrective swing of the 
regulatory pendulum.  However, the image of the swinging pendulum 
understates the differences between the Depression era and the 
current economic environment. 
A major difference between those earlier regulatory eras and our 
own is that natural monopolies and the tragedy of the commons 
involved market failures, in which the government sought to protect 
the public’s interest by intervening in particular market sectors.  In the 
global era, the focal point of regulation is not market failure per se, but 
competitiveness on a global scale, resulting in a comprehensive 
transformation of the rationales for government itself.  The 
neoliberalization of government means reformulating the government 
as a market actor suited to competition on a global scale—one 
appropriations budget, one agency, one entitlement at a time (to 
choose just some examples).  Such transformations are responsive to 
political pressures—including strong populist pressures—to maximize 
                                                                                                                 
 55. There were limits to how far the Supreme Court would go with agency 
deregulation. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225 
(1994) (concluding that the statutory term “modify” connotes only moderate change, 
not complete deregulation). 
 56. See AMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA, supra note 16, at 24–41, 47. 
 57. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
30 (1983) (holding that the agency could not rescind its rule requiring airbags without 
providing adequate reasons for this decision). 
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the circulation of wealth by eliminating, to the extent possible, the 
fixed costs of government.58 
Among the reasons for the popularity of privatized approaches to 
the provision of government services is a basic, often untested, 
assumption that efficiencies will result from competition attainable 
only in the private sector.  We call this “the efficiency story.”  The 
efficiency story rests on three premises: first, that government services 
are characteristically unduly encumbered with unnecessary costs and 
so-called red tape; second, that market competition produces a sort of 
Darwinian effect of favoring the fittest; and third, that competition is 
consistently a feature of private sector markets. 
None of these premises is valid in relation to the prison sector.  With 
respect to the relativity of public and private efficiency, a popular 
assumption promoted by the industry is that private prisons are more 
cost-efficient than public prisons.  However, more neutral studies, for 
example, a 2001 report under the auspices of the Bureau of Justice 
Assistance (BJA),59 indicate that the cost differential between private 
and public prisons is minimal.60  With regard to market competition: 
the prison market consists of few private sector providers and only 
very limited competition (in prison privatization, two main firms 
among approximately a score of others).61  These providers are a 
subset of the larger and more rapidly growing private security 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing post-Fordist capitalism); 
see also Alfred C. Aman, The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the 
Public/Private Distinction, Federalism and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 769, 787 
(1998). 
 59. The BJA, a federal agency charged with monitoring prisons and other aspects of 
the U.S. justice system, was established by the Justice Assistance Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-473, §§ 401–08, 98 Stat. 1837, 2080–85. 
 60. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at iii, 59 (comparing industry “proponents” 
claims to twenty percent savings over public prisons, with a BJA study showing savings 
closer to one percent, largely due to lower labor costs, and indicating other potential 
gains with respect to private prisons, especially the relatively greater openness of 
private prison administrators to positive reforms).  Overall, studies comparing the 
relative cost efficiency of public and private prisons are not conclusive, even to some 
advocates of privatization. See Geoffrey Segal, Comparing the Performance of Private 
and Public Prisons, REASON FOUND. (Apr. 4, 2008), 
http://www.reason.org/news/show/comparing-the-performance-of-p.html. 
 61. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 4.  For the entrepreneurial history of the 
major corporations involved in international, federal, state, and local privatization in 
the corrections sector, see The CCA Story: Our Company History, CCA, 
http://www.cca.com/our-history (last visited June 23, 2014); The Wackenhut 
Corporation History, FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-
histories/the-wackenhut-corporation-history/ (last visited June 23, 2014); see also 
discussion infra Part II. 
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industry.62  With regard to competition: the major public-private 
partnerships in the corrections field have long histories of multi-sided 
relationships.  But competitiveness is not a fixed notion, nor is it 
automatically limited to strictly economic issues. 
Privatization advocates have framed their appeals largely in terms 
of benefits to national, state, and local economies, while remaining 
relatively silent on the global context that today defines the very terms 
of economic competitiveness.  The purpose of this subsection has been 
to highlight the extent to which a global context is subsumed within 
the idea of competitiveness itself. 
C. Private Prisons and the Myth of Efficiency 
Let us now return to prison privatization, in light of the observations 
in the previous sections.  The discussion so far suggests that 
outsourcing in the United States occupies a dynamic political space 
brought about by the diversity of ways in which government is today 
positioned in relation to private enterprise on a global scale.  There is a 
vein of contradiction that runs through this space.  On the one hand, 
core governmental functions impose obligations on government 
budgets.  On the other hand, governments are also held to account—
administratively and by electorates—to minimizing those budgets and, 
directly or indirectly, the functions they support.  Seen in this light, 
privatization in the form of outsourcing is, in effect, a structural 
compromise—maintaining governmental functions while performing 
them through the private sector. 
Including prison privatization within the ambit of privatization 
overall was critical to the privatization movement’s strategists, for 
whom “the ideological stakes in the debate over correctional 
contracting [were] high.”63  For at least some critics, the sticking point 
was not privatization per se, but, more concretely, the risk of 
introducing new vested interests into the criminal justice system.64  
For others, with the privatization of prisons apparently now “here to 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See DONAHUE, supra note 3, on the relative weakness of the private prison 
market. 
 63. LOGAN, supra note 5, at 5. 
 64. See Michael Janus, Bars on the Iron Triangle: Public Policy Issues in the 
Privatization of Prisons, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 86 (Gary W. Bowman 
et al. eds., 1993); see also  SELMAN & LEIGHTON, supra note 35, at 77–104 (detailing a 
range of vested interests in a variety of prison contracts, including the real estate 
investment trust arrangements of the main private corrections firms (guaranteeing tax 
relief to the firms and a large return on profits to shareholders), and the IPO offerings 
of all the U.S. corrections firms that sell shares on the stock exchange)). 
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stay,”65 the concern is the emergence of a new bureaucratic form—
only ambiguously accountable to the public—at the conjuncture of 
government and business, broadening the scope of the state into ever-
expanding areas of the private sector.66  These contradictions and the 
complex environment within which private prisons function require 
that we revisit the rationales for prison privatization. 
1. Revisiting the Rationales for Privatizing Prisons 
Prison privatization emerged as a subject of debate among 
academics, advocates, and policy makers in the late 1980s—a time 
when prisons were dramatically overcrowded, with pressures building 
in favor of experimentation with new forms of funding to 
accommodate the radical increase in demand for prison space.  In his 
classic account, David Garland analyzes this period as marked by a 
dramatic and comprehensive shift in crime policy and public attitudes 
on both sides of the Atlantic—abandoning older ideas of rehabilitation 
in favor of punishment.67 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See Alexander Volokh, A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality and Accountability in 
Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1868 (2002).  On privatization as a durable 
element of corrections, see Feeley, supra note 34, at 339–40. 
 66. Sarah Armstrong calls it “entrepreneurial bureaucracy.”  Sarah Armstrong, 
Punishing Not-For-Profit: Implications of Nonprofit Privatization in Juvenile Punishment, 
4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 345, 347 (2002).  For Shichor and Gilbert, the relevant term is 
“subgovernment.” See David Shichor & Michael J. Gilbert, Introduction to PRIVATIZATION 
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE, supra note 2.  On the extension of the state 
into the entrepreneurial sector through prison privatization and alternatives to 
incarceration, see Feeley, supra note 34, at 322. 
 67. For an analysis of mass incarceration in the context of transnational neoliberal 
capitalism, see David Downes, The Macho Penal Economy: Mass Incarceration in the 
United States—a European Perspective, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 51, 51–65 (David Garland ed., 2001). See generally NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME 
CONTROL AS INDUSTRY: TOWARD GULAGS, WESTERN STYLE (3d ed. 2000); GARLAND, supra at 
note 19; THOMAS MATHIESEN, PRISON ON TRIAL (1990); JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: 
PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 (1993) [hereinafter SIMON, 
POOR DISCIPLINE]; Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the 
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and its Implication, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992); 
Jonathan Simon, Rise of the Carceral State, 74 SOC. RES. 471 (2007) [hereinafter Simon, 
Rise of the Carceral State].  On mass incarceration in the United States, see generally 
Natasha A. Frost & Todd R. Clear, Understanding Mass Incarceration as a Grand Social 
Experiment, 47 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 159 (2009); Michelle S. Phelps, 
Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality in U.S. Prison 
Programs, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 33 (2011).  Austin and Coventry suggest that given the 
intensity of contemporary cost-efficiency pressures, there is “little need” for industry 
promoters to make claims regarding their rehabilitative capacity. See AUSTIN & 
COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 13.  On mass incarceration in the United Kingdom, see 
generally GARLAND, supra note 19; Genders, supra note 4. 
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Discussion of prison privatization usually begins with the 
convergence of three developments: a burgeoning prison population, 
economic pressures on government coffers, and the mood of the 
electorate (e.g., pressing for more effective prosecution of street crime 
and longer sentences, and resistance to adding to tax burdens with 
construction of new facilities for inmates).  This is a standard narrative 
well established in academic and policy literatures.  In this context, it is 
worth emphasizing that the explosion of population growth in jails and 
prisons was not due to a general rise in criminal activity.  Rather, it was 
due to specific policy shifts that expanded criminalization, particularly 
of drug offenses, and approaches to punishment embodied by so-called 
three-strikes laws.  The legislative sources are the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984 (which created the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, whose guidelines went into effect on November 1, 1987) 
and the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1984 and 1987.68  These Acts resulted 
in new convictions, longer sentences and reduced availability of 
parole—filling prisons well beyond their designed capacity.69 
The spike in federal incarceration in the decade between the late 
1980s and the late 1990s is generally ascribed to the increase in 
convictions of non-violent drug offenders under the 1984 and 1988 
legislation cited above.  By the end of 1997, sixty-eight percent of all 
minimum-security federal prisoners were non-violent drug 
offenders.70  At the state level, forty-four percent of the increase in the 
prison population between 1986 and 1991 was due to the rise in non-
violent drug offense incarcerations.71  In South Carolina correctional 
facilities alone, between 1989 and 1993, there was a thirty-three 
percent increase in inmates.72  By 2001, a Department of Justice report 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 
1976; Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181.  The 
periodization of the dramatic rise in the inmate population to the effects of this 
legislation is well established by the separate studies of mass incarceration. See Gary 
W. Bowman et al., Introduction to PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 65, 
at 1–2; see also Hallett, supra note 40, at 371. See generally GARLAND, supra note 19; 
Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20; SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, supra note 68. 
 69. See Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 1.  Meanwhile, 
Congress continued to hold hearings on prison crowding, considering 
recommendations for reducing incarcerations by promoting alternatives to prison, 
such as electronic supervision, split sentences, half-way houses, and privatization. 
 70. JOANNE O’BRYANT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB92061, PRISONS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR 
CONGRESS 7 (2000). 
 71. See id. 
 72. See GEORGE SEXTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WORK IN AMERICAN PRISONS: JOINT VENTURES 
WITH THE PRIVATE SECTOR 5 (1995), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/workampr.pdf. 
378 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
estimated that some two million inmates were incarcerated in the 
United States.73 
Pressure against capacity became a persuasive rationale for 
privatization, at least among policy makers.  The policy scenario 
includes expanding accommodations for inmates with minimal 
investment on the part of government, by virtue of the government’s 
participation in corrections as a client rather than as provider.  One 
way to build new prisons without raising taxes is to outsource their 
construction and management to private firms.  Private firms pay the 
upfront construction costs and amortize them over a number of years.  
In this way, new prisons can be built without significantly affecting 
state taxes or budgets, although, as Hallett points out, taxpayers are 
involved eventually in all state expenditures.74 
Since at least the 1970s—well prior to the crowding crisis of the late 
1980s—federal capacity shortages were chronic in an episodic way, 
resulting in periodic demands for Congressional appropriations for 
Bureau of Prisons budgets and authorizations for new construction.  In 
1975, for example, Congressional hearings on the shortage of federal 
capacity considered a recommendation to transfer all federal prisoner 
administration to the states—along with other recommendations 
(some of them still under consideration today) regarding alternatives 
to incarceration.75  Congressional moratoria on new prison 
construction and reductions in block grants to states strained the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons and state agencies prior to the dramatic 
spike in the inmate population that has been well-noted for the later 
1980s and subsequently.76 
But one should not assume that prison privatization originated as an 
initiative within the government; it was an idea that circulated 
between actors in government and business firms long before the first 
private prisons were authorized.  The development of the market for 
                                                                                                                 
 73. AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at iii. 
 74. See Hallett, supra note 40, at 376. 
 75. Federal Bureau of Prisons Institutions Prison: Construction Plans and Policy: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and Administration of Justice of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 383 (1975), available at 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1975-hjh-
0027?accountid=13314 (login required). 
 76. The importance of Congressional attempts to discipline the Bureau of Prisons 
with funding limits and bans on new construction in the 1970s is two-fold: one, to 
highlight the relevance of states as resources available to the federal government to 
address deficiencies at the federal level, and two, to underscore the extent to which the 
public’s later reluctance to fund new prison construction with bond issues followed 
Congressional action. See supra notes 99–107.  On reductions of block grants to states, 
see SELLERS, supra note 36, at 14–16, tbl.1.3. 
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private prison services and management was complex over at least a 
decade prior to the initiatives that resulted in the full privatization of 
prisons—multi-faceted collaborations between federal, state, and local 
governments, and the private sector: businesses developing their 
competitive capacity and promoting their services while governments 
(in effect) warranted their investment by delivering legislation that 
allows for contracts in those service sectors.77  A governmental 
Request for Proposals (RFP), which solicits bids for a contract, is in this 
sense the culmination of a collaboration, not the beginning of one.  
Successful bids on contracts are, in turn, warrants (in effect) of the 
value of shareholder investment through public offerings.  The U.S. 
corrections field came into view as an untapped market from within 
the fast-paced development of the private security industry in the 
1980s,78 and after other countries began to contract for security and 
corrections facilities with U.S. corporations.79  It is not surprising that 
“the market” may consist of very few firms.  Within the United States, 
the vast majority of prison privatization contracts have been awarded 
to just two firms: Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and The 
GEO Group (GEO) (formerly Wackenhut Corrections Corporation).80  
These are large corporations that build and operate private prisons, 
among other services and products that pre-dated the emergence of 
opportunities for private prison construction and management.81 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See SELLERS, supra note 36; see also SELMAN & LEIGHTON, supra note 35, at 89–90, 
101. 
 78. See BECKETT supra note 35, at 101.  For a state-level case study of the 
complexities of private interests in law and order, see Michael C. Campbell, Politics, 
Prisons, and Law Enforcement: An Examination of the Emergence of “Law and Order” 
Politics in Texas, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (2011). 
 79. GEO’s website gives prominence to its contracts elsewhere in the English-
speaking world—South Africa, Australia, and the United Kingdom.  Indeed, GEO had 
extensive international clients prior to the expansion of its corrections sector in the 
United States. See Historic Milestones, GEO GROUP, INC., 
http://www.geogroup.com/history/ (last visited June 23, 2014); see also The 
Wackenhut Corporation History, supra note 62. 
 80. See AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at 4, tbl.3.  For the entrepreneurial history 
of one major corporation involved in international, federal, state, and local 
privatization in the corrections sector, see The Wackenhut Corporation History, supra 
note 62. 
 81. GEO was founded in 1984, Historic Milestones, supra note 80, and now runs 106 
facilities around the world, claiming a cost savings of thirty percent over the public 
sector. Welcome to the GEO Group, Inc., GEO GROUP, http://www.geogroup.com/ (last 
updated 2014).  Its first federal partnership was with ICE in 1987, in connection with 
the Aurora ICE Processing Center. Historic Milestones, supra note 80.  Its first federal 
contract to build and run an entire prison involved the demonstration project 
discussed below, at the Taft Correctional Institution, in California. See id.  CCA has been 
a long-time participant in public-private sector dialogues over prison privatization 
(including Congressional hearings and the President’s Commission on Privatization, 
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2. The Chronology of Prison Privatization 
The efficiency story usually associated with discussions of prison 
privatization has two elements—inmate crowding and cost control.  
However, as indicated in the previous section, it is not at all clear that 
prison privatization—at its inception—followed the dramatic increase 
in prosecutions in the late 1980s that led to higher rates of conviction 
and incarceration, and prison crowding.  A more agnostic view of the 
crowding crisis would acknowledge that prison crowding was the 
result of federal policies, not, initially, their justification.  Indeed, the 
rationales for prison privatization were developed—in think tanks, 
boardrooms, and private offices—at least a decade before the current 
overcrowding crisis became evident in the late 1980s and 1990s.  
Support for prison privatization among politicians and policy makers 
emerged earlier than—and independently of—the carceral explosion 
and voter resistance to bond issues, even if it later became inseparable 
from those developments.82 
At this same time, just ahead of the prison crowding crisis, crime 
and fear of crime became political issues as successive Republican 
Party platforms claimed policy credit for declines in the crime rate in 
1984 and 1988, as the Reagan and Bush Administrations expanded the 
scope of criminalization.83  The strategic gambit of controlling crime 
while controlling budgets continued throughout the 1990s.  The 
Republican Party’s platform in 1992 promoted privatization under the 
rubric of “managing government in the public interest”; it also noted 
President Bush’s freeze on regulation, new taxes, and commitment to 
balancing the budget.84  The pledge to expand privatization continued 
in the Republican Party’s platform in 1996, under the rubric of 
                                                                                                                 
cited below).  GEO’s CEO, George C. Zoley, has been active in promoting prison 
privatization to government since the early to mid-1980s. See id. 
 82. The Federal Bureau of Prisons’ 1990 budget submission called for doubling 
prison capacity by 1995.  The federal inmate population increased by fifty percent 
between 2000 and 2012—more than double the Bureau of Prisons’ targeted rate for 
reducing crowding. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-743, BUREAU OF PRISONS: 
GROWING INMATE CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, STAFF AND INFRASTRUCTURES 1 
(2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648123.pdf.  On the 
disconnections between political decision-making and the problems affecting the 
prison system, see Janus, supra note 65, at 86. 
 83. The Republican platforms mentioned declines in the crime rate in both years. 
See Republican Party Platform of 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 20, 1984), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25845 (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); 
Republican Party Platform of 1988, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 16, 1988), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25846 (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
 84. See Republican Party Platform of 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 17, 1992), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25847 (last visited June 22, 2014). 
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“streamlining government.”85  But streamlining government, in 
practice, primarily took the form of reductions of federal grants to 
states.86 
The practice of setting budget restrictions and imposing moratoria 
on new construction were consistent with strategies outlined by the 
GAO as likely to “encourage” agency managers to take privatization 
seriously: 
Governments may need to enact legislative changes and/or reduce 
resources available to government agencies in order to encourage 
greater use of privatization.  Georgia, for example, enacted legislation 
to reform the state’s civil service and to reduce the operating funds of 
state agencies.  Virginia reduced the size of the state’s workforce and 
enacted legislation to establish an independent state council to foster 
privatization efforts.  These actions, officials told us, sent a signal to 
managers and employees that political leaders were serious about 
implementing privatization.87 
Even with this surge of political interest in crime, prisons filling 
beyond capacity, and campaigns to promote privatization within the 
government, uptake of the private prison option was apparently slow 
to take hold.  A brief on prisons by the Congressional Research Service 
in 2000 indicates that the idea of contracting private management for 
the entirety of a prison’s operations was new and “controversial.”88  
GAO reports at the time indicated that a key concern was a perceived 
lack of clear statutory authority for outsourcing; fear of walkouts and 
strikes on the part of private sector prison staff were among the 
concerns raised by critics.89  In the United States today, roughly ten 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See Republican Party Platform of 1996, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 12, 1996), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848 (last visited Nov. 10, 
2014).  Earlier Republican platforms did not mention privatization.  In 1996, the 
director of the Bureau of Prisons, Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, supported privatization in 
her budget request on the grounds that it would be a means of complying with the 
Federal Workforce Restructuring Act, without reducing prison capacity.  For 
information on Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, see Historical Information, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/about/history/past_directors.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).  
Her successor, Harley G. Lappin (Director of the Bureau of Prisons from 2003 to 2011), 
left the government to take a position as Executive Vice-President and Chief 
Corrections Officer at CCA.  On Lappin’s move to the private sector, see PA Prison 
Report, HUM. RTS. COALITION, (June 13, 2011), http://www.hrcoalition.org/node/144.  
 86. See SELLERS, supra note 36, at 14–15. 
 87. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-87, PRIVATIZATION: QUESTIONS STATE 
AND LOCAL DECISIONMAKERS USED WHEN CONSIDERING PRIVATIZATION OPTIONS 12 (1998), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/200/198870.pdf.  
 88. See O’BRYANT, supra note 72, at 8.  
 89. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-158, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PRISONS: 
STUDIES COMPARING OPERATIONAL COSTS AND/OR QUALITY OF SERVICE: REPORT TO THE SUBCOMM. 
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percent of all prison and jail inmates are housed in privatized 
facilities—approximately 200,000 individuals.90  Approximately ten 
percent of federal inmates are housed in private facilities.91  By 2001, 
there were 158 private prison facilities in the United States.92  Most 
states have at least one private prison, with the largest numbers of 
privatized facilities in California, Florida, and Texas.93  Privatized 
detention facilities have also developed for the detention of juveniles 
and unregistered immigration.94 
Some states were ahead of the federal government in their 
experiments with privatization, encouraged in part by President Bush’s 
authorization to states and local governments receiving federal aid to 
privatize.95  By 1996, the GAO reported that “some states [had] 
contracted with private corporations for prison operations.”96  The 
fiscal year 1996 budget of the Federal Bureau of Prisons expanded its 
request for appropriations in this area.97  Finally, in 1997, GEO was 
awarded a five-year demonstration project to build and manage a 
private prison in Taft, California, bringing to fruition a long campaign, 
involving multiple parties within the federal government and in the 
private sector, in support of experimentally expanding the role of the 
private sector in corrections.98 
In sum, several policy and political developments converged to 
create the conditions that yielded prison privatization: a broad-based 
policy search for alternatives to incarceration;99 constraints on supply 
in the form of court-ordered ceilings on prison population in states;100 
                                                                                                                 
ON CRIME, COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY 1 (1996), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf. 
 90. On total prison and jail population, see Prison Privatization, supra note 19.  On 
federal prison population, see Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 6.
  
 91. See Bureau of Prisons: Recent Concerns, supra note 20, at 6–7.  
 92. See AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 20, at iii.  The same report indicates that 
3100 inmates were housed in private prisons worldwide in 1987, and 132,000 
worldwide in 1998. Id.  
 93. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 90, at 40 tbl.IV.1.  For analyses of 
citing decisions suggest the complexity of such processes, see generally Mona Lynch, 
Punishment, Purpose, and Place: A Case Study of Arizona’s Prison Siting Decisions, 50 
STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 105 (2009).  
 94. See Prison Privatization, supra note 19.  
 95. See Republican Party Platform of 1992, supra note 86. 
 96. O’BRYANT, supra note 72, at 1. 
 97. See id at 6. 
 98. See id.  
 99. See id. at 1, 7. 
 100. See TODD R. CLEAR, GEORGE F. COLE & MICHAEL D. REISIG, AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 474 
(10th ed. 2013) (discussing court-ordered ceilings). 
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failed bond issues for prison construction in states and 
municipalities;101 fluctuating appropriations to federal and state 
agencies;102 congressional caps on the federal budget and restrictions 
on new prison construction;103 rising demand resulting from 
Congressional legislation mandating new areas of federal prosecution 
and specific sentencing guidelines;104 and a Congressional mandate 
that shifted all D.C. prisoners into the federal system.105  Prison 
privatization became a new area of venture capital106 as privatization 
more broadly took hold as a philosophical/political commitment107—
                                                                                                                 
 101. See Prison Privatization, supra note 19. 
 102. O’BRYANT, supra note 72, at 2. 
 103. See JAMES, supra note 13, at 30 (“[R]ecent reductions in funding for the New 
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http://www.correctionsproject.com/corrections/pris_priv.htm (last visited June 17, 
2014). 
 107. The first two wholly private prisons under contract to the federal government 
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Be Built, Run By Private Firms, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18, 1990, at A10.  Leavenworth is a 
project of the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA).  CCA specializes in maximum 
security, and is the fifth largest corrections system in the United States (after its 
competitor, GEO, and three states).  It manages sixty-one facilities nationwide. See See 
CCA’s Nationwide System of Correctional Centers, CCA, https://www.cca.com/locations 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014).  In 1990, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons was Michael 
Quinlan (director 1987–1992), whose previous professional experience included 
service as executive assistant to the warden at Leavenworth Penitentiary. See J. 
Michael Quinlan, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/about/history/past_directors.jsp (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).  
Leavenworth is currently under contract to the U.S. Marshalls Service. See U.S. Facts 
Sheet, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/factsheets/general-
1209.html (last visited June 22, 2014).  Taft Correctional Institution was established by 
Congress in 1997, as a five-year federal demonstration project, under contract with 
GEO. See Historic Milestones, supra note 80.  A demonstration project of this kind was a 
longstanding recommendation of the GAO. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA)/GGD-
91-21, PRIVATE PRISONS: COST SAVINGS AND BOP’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY NEED TO BE RESOLVED 
4–5 (1991), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150187.pdf; U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-1BR, PRISON CROWDING: ISSUES FACING THE NATION’S 
PRISON SYSTEMS 19 (1989), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/77582.pdf; see 
also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 5.  The project evaluation was 
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both developments taking place prior to the crowding of prisons and 
funding and resource shortages that are the more usual start to 
narratives on this subject.  An appropriate chronology is key to 
understanding the context of prison privatization in relation to 
neoliberal globalization, and its current stakes in human terms. 
To conclude Part I, we suggest that while there is obvious relevance 
to the fact of prison crowding and the reality of taxpayer resistance to 
funding expansions of government obligations, one must consider the 
possibility that the loss of political support for funding the government 
and the popularity of marketization were the result of the neoliberal 
policies rather than its driving cause.  In our view, explaining the 
origins of prison privatization in the situation of underfunding and 
overcrowding risks mistakes effects as causes. 
By 1988, the push to privatize prisons, in one form or another, 
involved every branch of government at the highest levels, revealing 
significant tensions between them, as well as between and within the 
two main political parties.  It is crucial to appreciate the differences 
between the visions and values that guided these efforts; this is the 
theme of Part II. 
II.  PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND PRISON LABOR 
The previous discussion argues for lengthening the chronology of 
prison privatization so as to include the privatization movement in 
history in an integral way.  Doing so adds at least a decade to the story.  
It also broadens and enriches the context around prison privatization, 
to include more of the complex social, legal, and political tectonics of 
the period.  Prisons were at the crux of the contradictory crosscurrents 
discussed above, as demand for stronger measures against offenders 
(and corresponding demand for new prisons) was at odds with the 
simultaneous demand for leaner government and brakes on public 
expenditure.  Whatever the appeal of privatization as a structural 
compromise in theory, the substantive consequences were dramatic as 
a practical matter.  Rates of imprisonment soared even as crime rates 
declined.108  Concerned by the unprecedented levels of incarceration 
                                                                                                                 
contracted to a private consulting firm, Abt Associates. See DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & 
KENNETH CARLSON, ABT ASSOCS., INC., CONTRACTING FOR IMPRISONMENT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: 
COST AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PRIVATELY OPERATED TAFT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION v (2005), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211990.pdf. 
 
 108. On privatization as part of the context for mass imprisonment, see GARLAND, 
supra note 19, at 131–35.  The phrase “mass imprisonment”—now in general usage—
was Garland’s coinage.  In Garland’s analysis, mass imprisonment—“the systematic 
imprisonment of whole groups” (in the United States, young black men)—was the 
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that heavily disfavored young black men, some socio-legal scholars 
saw the situation as a fundamental transformation of state and 
society—as prisons filled with young men who had been displaced 
from the labor force in a new climate in which economic risk was 
displaced onto workers, for whom persistent under- and 
unemployment became the norm.109  However, crime policies turned 
away from rehabilitation, and increasingly toward confinement and 
punishment.110  As David Garland observes, incarceration was no 
longer a matter of reforming individual offenders, but of newly normal 
selective effects that made prison “a shaping institution for whole 
sectors of the population.”111 
These were major changes; however, from the vantage points 
afforded by the longer timeframe we propose for prison privatization, 
the budget constraints and prison overcrowding subsequent to the late 
1980’s may be seen as relatively late developments.  The prison crisis 
may account for the conditions that made prison privatization (like 
privatization more generally) politically saleable, but the context, the 
idea, its rationales and strategies for implementation, and even the 
firms themselves were already explicitly circulating by that time.  In 
this Part, we look to that earlier period—to two earlier prison reform 
initiatives that are part of the longer history that made privatization 
integral to the globalization of capital.  Both initiatives involve prison 
labor.  Their similarities and differences are relevant to an analysis of 
privatization as entailing diverse means and ends, as well as diverse 
political locations within and beyond government. 
These initiatives were Federal Prison Industries, now known as 
“UNICOR,” and Prison Industry Enhancement, or PIE.  UNICOR is a 
                                                                                                                 
“overdetermined outcome of a converging series of policies and decisions” that 
included prison privatization and “Reaganomics.” David Garland, Introduction: The 
Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, 
supra note 68, at 2 [hereinafter Garland, Introduction]. 
 109. On the need for attention to the restructuring of the economy, see McLennan, 
The New Penal State, supra note 23, at 407, 415.  On income inequality, see generally 
Martina Morris & Bruce Western, Inequality in Earnings at the Close of the Twentieth 
Century, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 623 (1999).  On globalization, see generally Ruth Wilson 
Gilmore, Globalisation and U.S. Prison Growth: From Military Keynesianism to post-
Keynesian Militarism, 40 RACE & CLASS 171 (1998/1999). 
 110. Major analyses are now classics in socio-legal studies.  In addition to GARLAND, 
supra note 19 and MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES, supra note 68. 
See generally CHRISTIE, supra note 68; MATHIESEN, supra note 68; SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE, 
supra note 68; Feeley & Simon, supra note 68; Simon, Rise of the Carceral State, supra 
note 68.  On privatization and welfare policy, see Downes, supra note 68, 61–63; see 
also JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE 
FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 73–108 (2014). 
 111. Garland, Introduction, supra note 109, at 1. 
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government owned corporation that manages inmate production of 
goods and services available for sale to the government and, under 
some circumstances, on the open market.112  In its current incarnation, 
UNICOR is a form of outsourcing in the sense that it draws on labor 
segregated from the domestic labor force by a state border (i.e., prison 
walls) that demarcates a legal differential of wages and hours, among 
other things.113  UNICOR is not a private enterprise, but it has been 
increasingly pressed to “act” like a private sector firm since its re-
establishment by Congress as a self-supporting agency in 1988, and 
on-going pressures in the direction of increased competition and 
absorption of financial risk.114 
By contrast, PIE brings private firms into prisons, giving private 
sector employers access to inmates as a work force.115  UNICOR 
produces goods and services for an essentially governmentally-
guaranteed market (as we shall see); PIE relies on the open market.116  
Together, consideration of these programs (discussed separately in the 
following sections) lends fresh prominence to the role of labor in 
relation to privatization in the prison context.  Once the integral 
relation of prison labor and global capital is appreciated, prison 
privatization and the new pressures on labor to absorb the risk in 
economic fluctuations may be understood in turn as related 
developments.  By attending to the government’s diverse efforts to 
position prison labor in relation to privatization, the connections 
between globalization, privatization, and prisons are themselves 
clarified—in turn clarifying the context of prison reform as entailing 
issues beyond prisons, particularly in relation to the vulnerability of 
the labor force to fluctuating market conditions. 
                                                                                                                 
 112.  UNICOR, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/unicor.jsp. 
 113.  See Prison Labor: Outsourcing’s “Best Kept Secret,” CIO.COM, 
http://www.cio.com/article/2417888/outsourcing/prison-labor--outsourcing-s--
best-kept-secret-.html (“Since 1999, private corporations in the U.S. have outsourced a 
variety of business services to federal prison inmates, who today earn around $1 an 
hour for call center work. Proponents of the practice claim prison labor is a low-cost 
alternative to offshore outsourcing, but critics say it takes jobs away from law-abiding 
U.S. citizens.”). 
 114.  Cf. Nate C. Hindman, Unicor Under Fire for Dominating Small Competitors with 
Cheap Prison Labor, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2012, 12:48 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/15/unicor-prison-labor_n_1778765.html. 
 115.  See DOMINGO S. HERRAIZ, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, PROGRAM BRIEF: PRISON 
INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (2004), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/203483.pdf. 
 116.  See id. at 3 (describing program criteria, including “[a]uthority to involve the 
private sector in the production and sale of inmate-made goods on the open market”).,  
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A. Prison Industry Enhancement (PIE) 
PIE is a key development in prison privatization that dates from the 
1970s, ultimately taking the form of the Prison Industry Enhancement 
Certification Program (PIECP) in 1979.  PIECP is a federal program set 
up under the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979117—legislation 
sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), with co-sponsors from 
both sides of the aisle.118  The Act set up the main federal agencies 
charged with research and evaluation of criminal justice programs, 
including corrections: the National Institute of Justice, the National 
Criminal Justice Research Center, the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics.119  The final 
section of the Act set up the PIECP, a program designed to give 
authorization, on a limited and prescribed basis, to state and local 
corrections agencies to contract with private sector firms for purposes 
of running those firms’ operations within prisons.120 
Subsequently expanded to offer broader participation, eligibility for 
enhanced prison industry certification entails specific conditions.  In 
particular, if prison-made goods are to be sold on the open market, 
wages must be on a par with other local producers, and there must be 
no displacement of local workers.121  These restrictions have tended to 
reinforce niche production, i.e., in sectors where there is no local 
competition.  Partners must further demonstrate that their venture 
will not impair existing contracts.122  Labor unions must be informed 
and consulted.123  Once certification is complete, the PIE model 
involves two main features.  First, it brings a private sector enterprise 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, Pub.L. 96–157, 93 Stat. 1167 (1979). 
 118. The bill was co-sponsored by Republican Robert McClory of Illinois. H.R. 2061 
(96th): Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/96/hr2061  (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
 119. About the Bureau of Justice Statistics, BUREAU JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=abu. 
 120. Individual enhanced prison industry programs set up under PIECP are known 
by the nickname “PIE”—for Prison Industry Enhancement.  Description of the Act, 
PIECP, and individual PIEs is based on the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979, 
Pub. L. No. 96-157, 93 Stat. 1167.  The best and most comprehensive analysis of PIECP, 
and a detailed assessment of South Carolina’s experience with PIE, is an unpublished 
doctoral dissertation by Marie Fajardo Ragghianti. Marie Fajardo Ragghianti, Prison 
Industries in South Carolina: 1996-2005, Why and How the PIE Model Prospered 128–
232 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/8178/1/umi-umd-5360.pdf; see also 
SEXTON, supra note 73. 
 121.  See Ragghianti, supra note 120, at 187. 
 122.  Id.   
 123.  Id. at 46. 
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fully within the prison walls, to be run on standard business principles, 
for profit.124  Second, prisoners are employees of the company, earning 
wages that are subject to various forms of withholding (FICA, Medicaid, 
taxes, child support, and required personal savings for the inmate’s 
use, post-release).125  There are a variety of employment models; some 
inmates work directly for the company, while others are employed by 
prison management and assigned to the company.  States write their 
own guidelines for enhanced prison industry programs.126 
Uptake of PIE has been selective—perhaps an indication of the 
particularity of the circumstances favoring such joint ventures.127  The 
most successful PIEs in terms of private sector response and 
profitability of their enterprises are in South Carolina, Kansas, and 
Texas.128  South Carolina’s program has been the largest and most 
successful program from the outset in the vanguard of recruiting 
private sector ventures and developing successful partnerships with 
firms.129  In South Carolina, the Division of Corrections Industries’ 
private sector partners include Fortune 500 companies such as Escod 
Industries (a cable manufacturing firm whose clients include IBM), as 
well as commercial enterprises that include Third Generation (a luxury 
lingerie manufacturer for retailers such as Victoria’s Secret and J.C. 
Penney) and Jostens, Inc. (the nation’s largest manufacturer of 
graduation gowns).130  Other states have successfully engaged other 
partners.  California’s enhanced prison industry ventures at one time 
included a Trans World Airlines reservations call center in a youth 
detention center.131  Arizona’s ventures included a Best Western 
reservation call center in a women’s prison.132  Connecticut’s included 
                                                                                                                 
 124.  See HERRAIZ, supra note 115, at 3 (“The program provides a stable and readily 
available workforce. In addition, many correctional agencies provide manufacturing 
space to private-sector companies involved in the program.”). 
 125.  ISee id. at 3 (“Corrections departments may opt to take deductions from inmate 
worker wages. Permissible deductions are limited to taxes, room and board, family 
support, and victims’ compensation.”). 
 126. Ragghianti ascribes some of South Carolina’s success to the Division of 
Corrections Industries director’s inclusion of organized labor in a revision of the state 
guidelines. Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 157.  In some states, guidelines were less 
well received; the Washington State Supreme Court declared the state’s PIE 
unconstitutional. Wash. Water Jet Ski Workers Ass’n v. Yarbrough, 90 P.3d 42 (Wash. 
2004); see Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 273–76. 
 127.  See generally SEXTON, supra note 72. 
 128. Figures are as of 2008. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 322. 
 129. See id. at 9. 
 130. See SEXTON, supra note 73, at 7–8. 
 131. See id. at 9–10. 
 132. See id. at 9. 
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the Chesapeake Cap Company (a manufacturer of baseball caps).133  By 
1993, thirty-two correctional agencies were participating in the 
private sector market through PIECP.134  By the end of 2000, a total of 
some 3700 state inmates were participating in PIE;135 by the end of 
2005, 6555 inmates were in the program, bringing the total inmate 
participation to 70,000 since its inception.136 
In South Carolina and elsewhere, enhanced prison industries under 
PIECP are more profitable than the older Federal Prison Industries 
program (further discussion below), and both are more profitable than 
traditional prison work programs (license plates, road signs, etc.).137  
However, the private sector has not been responsive to enhanced 
prison industry initiatives in many states, and a study by Thomas 
Petersik et al., sponsored by the National Corrections Institute of 
America (NCIA) found that the benefits and beneficiaries of prison 
industry enhancement are neither well known nor understood.138 
The Petersik et al. study remains the principal source on the 
question of the benefits of the PIE program.  The research team asked 
two questions: Who are the financial beneficiaries of PIE wages?  And, 
what would be the effect of paying PIE employees on par with the 
civilian work force?  The answer to the first question was very broad.  
Petersik et al. found that fifty-three to fifty-seven cents on every dollar 
of inmate wages goes to beneficiaries other than the inmate.139  Non-
inmate beneficiaries prominently include the corrections system, with 
approximately one third of inmate wages going to his or her room and 
board costs.140  Other beneficiaries include the taxpayers who derive 
indirect benefit from reduced pressure on state budgets due to 
inmates’ wage contributions.  With regard to the effects of improving 
wages and expanding the program, Petersik’s team found that PIE’s 
                                                                                                                 
 133. See id. at 10–11.  For additional partnerships, see also FPI Inmate Programs, 
UNICOR, http://www.unicor.gov/About_FPI_Programs.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 
2014). 
 134. See SEXTON, supra note 73, at 3. 
 135. See THOMAS W. PETERSIK ET AL., IDENTIFYING BENEFICIARIES OF PIE INCOMES: WHO 
BENEFITS FROM WAGE EARNINGS OF INMATES WORKING IN THE PRISON INDUSTRY ENHANCEMENT 
(PIE) PROGRAM 1 (2003), available at http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-
content/uploads/researchfullrpt1.pdf; see also MARILYN C. MOSES & CINDY J. SMITH, 
FACTORIES BEHIND FENCES: DO PRISON ‘REAL WORK’ PROGRAMS WORK? 33 (2007), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/jr000257h.pdf. 
 136. See MOSES & SMITH, supra note 136. 
 137. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 12. 
 138. PETERSIK, ET AL., supra note 136, at 7. 
 139. Id. at xii.  PIE inmates in South Carolina have sued over deductions. See 
Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 168. 
 140. See PETERSIK, ET AL., supra note 136, at xiii. 
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profitability and benefits would likely increase under both 
conditions.141 
While PIE’s advocates in corrections and in the private sector are 
attentive to the prospects for assimilating prison labor into the 
economy,142 the thrust of their concerns has mainly been in directions 
other than raising wages.  PIE offers entrepreneurs a competitive 
advantage over the alternative of moving to Mexico or offshore, 
depending on the location of a prison factory relative to its markets, 
among other factors.  One corporate head reported using his PIE plant 
for lower-end products (involving low skill), especially in areas of 
unsteady demand—reserving higher-end products with steadier 
demand for his “civilian” labor force.143  In his view, PIE offered him a 
cushion in the global economy, absorbing fluctuations in demand in a 
way that allowed his firm to maintain maximum profitability in a 
highly competitive global environment.  The director of South 
Carolina’s PIE program, Tony Ellis, also emphasizes the flexibility of 
the prison labor force in his references to PIE as a form of “leased 
labor.”144 
The conditions that have made PIE successful in South Carolina 
involve an approach to prison labor as labor in the global economy.  
The small scale of the PIE program, and the relatively small role of 
organized labor in South Carolina, feature among these conditions, as 
well.145  Following a 1977 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, inmate workers 
are not allowed to organize, and, under South Carolina state law, have 
no private rights in the labor context.146  Proposals to raise wages or 
shift to higher-skilled job training (to maximize post-release job 
opportunities for inmates) have not prevailed—nor have proposals to 
restrict PIE to sectors in which there is no domestic competition (i.e., 
for which there is only an off-shore alternative).147 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See id. at xvi. 
 142. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 178. 
 143. See SEXTON, supra note 73, at 6–7, 9 (quoting Pat Timms, Escod’s Vice President 
of Operations). 
 144. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 168, 171 (quoting Tony Ellis). 
 145. See id. at 168 (quoting Tony Ellis). 
 146. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977); see also 
Susan Blankenship, Revisiting the Democratic Promise of Prisoners’ Labor Unions, 37 
STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y 241 (2005) (proposing that prisoners’ labor unions would give a 
constructive voice to inmates in relation to the prison crisis). 
 147.  See, e.g., BARBARA J. AUERBACH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
EMERGING PRACTICES: WAGE POLICIES AND PRACTICES FOR THE PRISON INDUSTRIES ENHANCEMENT 
CERTIFICATION PROGRAM (PIECP) 2 (2001) (“PIECP wages tend to be set at, or slightly 
above, the Federal minimum wage . . .  reflecting the entry level, labor intensive nature 
of PIECP work.”). Far from limiting production to sectors that lack domestic 
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To the extent that PIE delivers financial benefits to individuals 
beyond the inmate/employees, the program is apparently most 
successful as a sustainability mechanism for corrections agencies, and 
least successful when it is set up as a means of revenue generation for 
other parts of state budgets.148  In some states, PIE revenues are 
diverted by the legislature into other programs besides corrections—a 
controversial practice that tends to compromise the viability of PIEs in 
those states.149  Such issues and debates underscore the extent to 
which PIE should be understood as a privatization initiative shaped by 
an ongoing restructuring of state economies within globalization. 
The benefits of PIE are not limited to revenue, however.  The 
program has been presented as contributing to lowered rates of 
recidivism and improvements in post-release employment.  A 2006 
National Institute of Justice study confirmed positive effects for PIE 
alumni/ae in terms of higher rates of employment and lower rates of 
recidivism than those of inmates whose work experience was in other 
prison programs.150  The authors indicate that—given methodological 
constraints—these positive outcomes cannot be conclusively 
attributed to PIE experience specifically, since inmates are not 
randomly assigned to PIE and the other programs.151  Still, they 
                                                                                                                 
competition, PIECP operations have included, inter alia, aluminum screen and circuit 
board production, glove manufacture, alfalfa production, papaya packing in Hawaii, 
potato processing, and boat building. See Marilyn C. Moses & Cindy J. Smith, Factories 
Behind Fences: Do Prison ‘Real Work’ Programs Work?, NAT’L INST. JUST. (2007), 
http://www.nij.gov/journals/257/pages/real-work-programs.aspx. 
 148. Ragghianti’s study of South Carolina’s experience with PIE emphasizes the 
importance of personal and institutional commitment, clarity of objectives, and 
continuity as additional factors in PIE success. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 315.  
A full section of her dissertation charts the highly effective involvement of Tony Ellis, 
director of the state Division of Correction Industries, and former state director of 
procurement. See id. at 161–81.  Ellis had a long and successful tenure as director of 
South Carolina’s PIE program, and was personally involved in recruiting firms.  
Ragghianti credits his success with inspiring other southern corrections agencies—
formerly resistant to PIE—to participate.  At the time of her writing, Ellis had just 
retired, so the long-term success of the South Carolina PIE program beyond his 
directorship remained to be seen.  See id. at 295, n.33. 
 149. See id. at 281. 
 150. See CINDY J. SMITH ET AL., CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES: PREPARING INMATES FOR RE-ENTRY: 
RECIDIVISM AND POST-RELEASE EMPLOYMENT 9 (2006), available at  
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/214608.pdf; see also MOSES & SMITH, supra 
note 136, at 33–34. 
 151. See MOSES & SMITH, supra note 136, at 33.  PIE is a voluntary program.  South 
Carolina’s eligibility requirements include a GED (or current participation in a GED 
program) and no recent disciplinary infractions in prison. See Ragghianti, supra note 
121, at 104.  Overall, Petersik et al. find that PIE inmates tend to serve longer sentences 
for more violent crimes, but have a far lower rate of drug-related offenses than the 
general prison population. PETERSIK, ET AL., supra note 136, at 96, tbl.A5.  Longer 
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emphasize that PIE yields positive outcomes for inmates after release, 
and that it remains an “underutilized option.”152 
The NIJ studies of Petersik et al. and Cindy J. Smith et al.153 implicitly 
raise the question as to why the PIE model has not been more widely 
adopted.  Marie Fajardo Ragghianti’s evaluation study points to the gap 
between the politics and realities of corrections as one possible 
reason154—or rather, a set of reasons including the politicization of a 
distinction between rehabilitation and security155 and a pervasive 
disregard for benefits to prisoners.  In spite of the favorable outcome 
assessments by NIJ studies cited above, Congress reduced funding for 
the Bureau of Justice Assistance, resulting in cuts to the National 
Center on Institutions and Alternatives and, in that connection, to the 
PIECP national coordinator’s office.156 
The PIE program was saved, but by that time the national politics of 
privatization had shifted from the sustainability model offered by PIE 
to the revenue-generation model. .157  The difference between these 
was, in effect, the difference between treating prisoners as earners in a 
                                                                                                                 
sentences mean that PIE inmates may have benefitted from other prison work 
programs, and other forms of support. See Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 302. 
 152. See PETERSIK ET AL., supra note 136, at 84; see also MOSES & SMITH, supra note 136, 
at 34–35. 
 153. SMITH ET AL., supra note 151. 
 154. Ragghianti, supra note 121, at 292–93. 
 155. See id. at 5. 
 156. See id. at 291. 
 157.  See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the 
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 869 (2008) 
(“‘[P]rison industries’—prison labor programs producing goods or services sold to 
other government agencies or to the private sector—are the highest-profile and most 
controversial form of prison labor. Since roughly the New Deal era, prison industries 
have been tightly regulated, most prominently through the Ashurst-Sumners Act’s 
criminal prohibition on the sale of inmate-produced goods in interstate commerce. 
Government purchasers always have been exempted, however, as part of the broader 
New Deal-era compromise permitting prison labor for ‘state use.’ Limits on other 
purchases gradually have relaxed over the past thirty years. Additionally, few 
restrictions apply to the growing sale of services performed by prisoners. Today, 
prison industries generate $2 billion in revenue annually.” (footnotes omitted); cf. 
Ryan S. Marion, Note, Prisoners for Sale: Making the Thirteenth Amendment Case 
Against Sate Private Prison Contracts, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 214 (2009) 
(“Private prisons . . .  mimic their public counterparts in one interesting aspect: prison 
labor. As in state jail, prisoners confined by the state to a privately owned facility must 
perform menial tasks for little to no pay. The point of such work, consequently, is 
reformation and rehabilitation. By doing such work in the private context, however, 
prisoners directly contribute to the profit-making function of the corporation. At the 
very least, therefore, inmate labor in private prisons constitutes ‘involuntary 
servitude.’ If the state is characterized as ‘contracting out’ inmates to these 
corporations who subsequently aid the prison in earning corporate revenue, the 
system begins to resemble a modern day form of slavery.” (footnotes omitted)). 
2014] INMATE LABOR 393 
global economy—with all the precarity of non-inmate workers in their 
same employment sector—and prisoners as revenue streams flowing 
directly to state treasuries.  Debates over parity and efficiency as 
competing values in the corrections labor setting remain intense.158 
B. Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) and the Debate Over 
Prison Labor 
PIE is just one initiative aimed at reforming prison labor—one 
whose uptake by states and localities remained highly limited even 
after Congress expanded the maximum PIE certifications from seven to 
fifty.159  But by far the largest prison industries program is the one run 
by the federal government—Federal Prison Industries, Inc., now 
known by its trade name UNICOR.160  All federal prisoners are required 
to work, unless they are physically unable or exempted as security 
risks.161  Most prison work involves inmates in the work of the prison 
                                                                                                                 
 158. See Matthew J. Lang, The Search for a Workable Standard for When Fair Labor 
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Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 59 (1997) [hereinafter Options to Improve and 
Expand Federal Prison Industries], available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju58956.000/hju58956_0f.htm.  
Florida developed its own program, Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified 
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prisons. See PRIDE, http://www.pride-enterprises.org (last visited June 27, 2014); see 
also Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified Enterprises, Inc., FLA. DEP’T 
CORRECTIONS, http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/annual/1011/pride.html (last visited Sept. 
28, 2014). 
 160. See About UNICOR, UNICOR, http://www.unicor.gov./about.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2015). 
 161. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2905, 104 Stat 4789, 
4914. 
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itself, or in production of goods for other state agencies with limited 
market value, such as license plates and road signs, among other 
things.  This type of prison labor is conventionally referred to as 
“traditional” prison labor.  UNICOR, which employs about twenty-two 
percent of all federal prisoners,162 involves a different model, 
conventionally known as “prison industries.”163  Inmates involved in 
UNICOR produce goods for sale on the open market—under specific 
conditions aimed at minimizing competition with the private sector, 
and avoiding displacement of civilian labor.  Its market is protected by 
a mandatory sourcing rule, requiring all federal agencies to give 
preference to UNICOR’s goods and services in their own procurement 
practices (with certain exceptions). 
UNICOR is the trademark of what is also known as Federal Prison 
Industries, Inc. (FPI).164  FPI was established in 1934 by President 
Roosevelt as an effort to coordinate prison industries nationwide so as 
to minimize disruption of civilian labor in any one sector of 
production.165  The program was reauthorized in 1948.166  FPI 
supported defense industries during the Second World War, the 
Korean War, and the war in Vietnam.167  After the end of the Vietnam 
War, it developed a diversified portfolio of goods and services for 
sale.168  In some respects, FPI took its modern form as a corporation 
(i.e., independent spending authority, without Congressional 
appropriation) with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.169  
Under this statute, it was required to be self-supporting, and to comply 
with several conditions before selling its products on the open 
market—legislative efforts that reflected larger concerns with tax 
burdens and private sector competitiveness in the national and 
international economy. 
Federal Prison Industries, Inc., is now known both as FPI, Inc. and 
UNICOR.  UNICOR’s in-house historical narrative credits Chief Justice 
Burger’s “factories with fences” concept as the inspiration for its 
current form, although it is not clear that UNICOR represents a specific 
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implementation of the Task Force’s recommendations.170  The Chief 
Justice’s Task Force is discussed in the next section.  One principle 
difference between the Task Force recommendations and UNICOR as 
practiced is that UNICOR does not claim rehabilitation as its primary 
goal; indeed, UNICOR is explicit in stating that rehabilitation is not the 
primary goal that it was in the past.171  Rather, UNICOR has adopted 
what the website refers to as a “balanced model”—combining 
“punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation” with rehabilitation.172  
Another key difference involves the prison industries themselves, 
which are not owned by the private sector as envisioned in the Task 
Force report. 
UNICOR is self-supporting, and there is no federal appropriation for 
its operations.  The principal source of its revenue is sales.  
Approximately seventy-four percent of sales revenues are used for the 
purchase of materials.173  Inmates are paid wages, but their net share is 
considerably less than that of PIE participants (four percent, compared 
to about forty-three to forty-seven percent in PIE).174 Still, UNICOR is 
more remunerative for inmates than traditional forms of prison labor; 
most wages under traditional prison labor regimes are charged back to 
the agencies for the prisoner’s upkeep.175 
UNICOR is a product of the New Deal rather than the age of 
neoliberalism, and its recent history is indicative of tensions between 
these two paradigms of liberalism.  In the 1980’s, fifty years after its 
inception, UNICOR became controversial, subject to a spate of 
Congressional legislative initiatives, hearings, and evaluation projects; 
these continue today.  The main debates involve competition with the 
private sector, the enforcement of (and exceptions to) the mandatory 
source rule, the level of wages of inmate workers, and overall 
effectiveness as a prison program.  The effectiveness questions appear 
to have been settled by independent studies of recidivism and other 
aspects of former inmates’ post-release experiences.176  An 
independent study, mandated by Congress in 1991, confirmed minimal 
displacement of civilian labor,177 but competition and mandatory 
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sourcing have remained contentious.  In key respects, the debates 
reflect wider policy debates (i.e., outside of the prison context) over 
wages, social security, and free trade—with UNICOR’s reliance on 
market protections coming under steady challenge, as its critics (from 
the right and the left, for different reasons) pushed for more 
competitive sourcing for government agencies, and for wage parity 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.178 
Almost immediately after passage of the 1988 law that repositioned 
UNICOR in relation to private sector markets, bills from both sides of 
the aisle—most of which failed—were repeatedly introduced in 
Congress in an effort to revise or repeal the mandatory sourcing 
rule.179  Congressional hearings in 1997 were intended to resolve 
tensions between UNICOR and its various critical camps by 
recalibrating the linkage between mandatory sourcing and civilian 
competition—in part by adjusting the sourcing rule, and in part by 
promoting UNICOR’s production of goods and services that had 
migrated offshore.180  The hearings made plain the wide range of 
views—from a critique of prison industries as “‘quasi-slave’ labor,”181 
to endorsements of PIE182 and PRIDE,183 to advocacy for specific 
                                                                                                                 
 178. H.R. 2965, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006), had it become law, would have given 
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 181. See id. at 14–16 (statement of Rep. Jackson Lee, Member, H. Comm. on the 
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 182. See id. at 34–36 (statement of Robert Sanders Division of Prison Industries, S.C. 
Dep’t of Corrs.). 
 183. See id. at 24–33 (statement of Michael N. Harrell, Gen. Manager of New Bus. 
Dev., Pride Enters.); id. at 42–49 (statement of Kenneth Mellem, President & CEO, 
Geonex Corp.). 
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proposals to eliminate the mandatory sourcing rule,184 among other 
reforms of UNICOR.  Subsequent hearings and revisions of the 
mandatory source rule led to greater procurement flexibility on the 
part of federal agencies, particularly the Department of Defense and 
the CIA.185 
While the prison population continued to increase in the 2000’s,186 
prison industries slumped in 2010 and suffered a loss of profitability 
over at least the next three fiscal years187—reflecting the impact of the 
global economic crisis on consumers (even large institutional 
consumers such as government agencies), as well as prison industries’ 
new exposure to competition.  The political rhetoric surrounding 
federal prison industries shifted increasingly to a financialized model 
at the same time that it reduced the market protections for prison-
made goods and services—and during the same period when prison 
industries themselves shifted increasingly away from both the 
discourse and practice of inmate rehabilitation.188  While a causal link 
between these two broad developments (financialization and 
punishment) is unlikely to be found, they may be seen as related 
historically and functionally—given the simultaneous pressures on 
correctional agencies to both discipline offenders and capitalize on 
inmates’ potential to contribute to corrections revenue streams.189 
C. Reforming Prisons Through Privatization: Two Models 
1. Privatizing Inmate Labor: Chief Justice Burger’s Task Force Model 
As noted in Part I, privatization was well-established as a principle 
of government administration long before private prisons were on the 
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horizon.  In the 1970s, the Department of Justice developed a package 
of reforms of the prison labor system, envisioning a role for private 
industry within prisons—as an innovation in rehabilitation, and an 
improvement on the Federal Industries System.190  Chief Justice 
Warren Burger was personally committed to prison labor reform along 
these lines and is credited with having formulated the “factories with 
fences” phrase that was widely associated with the concept.191  He was 
instrumental in convening a meeting in 1984, co-sponsored by the 
Johnson Foundation and the Brookings Institutions, that led to the 
development of a National Task Force on Prison Industries in 
February, 1985.192  The Task Force led in turn to an extensive 
deliberation process involving representatives of the bench, the bar, 
corrections professionals, academics, business and labor leaders, and 
members of the Senate and House of Representatives; their meetings 
resulted in a series of principles and recommendations that were 
published in June, 1986.193  Their recommendations resulted in the 
formation of the National Center for Innovations in Corrections, an 
advisory group for states and localities interested in reform. 
The overall purpose embraced by the Task Force was to transform 
prison labor into a platform for reforming the entire prison system 
around principles of rehabilitation and improvement of inmates’ post-
release prospects.194  The recommendations included an 
organizational structure combining internal and external governance 
structures for prison industries, with inmate participation in both 
bodies.195  A strong role for organized labor alongside business was 
also envisioned.  Overall management of the prison would remain with 
the corrections agency. 
Meanwhile, Congressional hearings on prison industries reform, 
including members of Congress and witnesses who were also 
participating in the Task Force as members of the advisory board or as 
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committee members, followed in 1985.196  The proposed reforms by 
the Task Force sought an expansion of the private sector role 
established for states by the Justice Systems Improvement Act of 
1979,197 for all levels of the correction system.  The recommendations 
also included reforms aimed at developing parity of conditions for 
inmate workers relative to the civilian workforce—setting limits to the 
work day and work week, wages at the federal minimum wage, 
affirming the right to organize, and other measures aimed at bringing 
to an end the exploitation and abuses of the old contract labor and 
leasing practices.198  As we have discussed above, Congress established 
PIE and subjected UNICOR to the constraints of privatization, but it did 
not include prison workers under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 
2. Privatizing Prison Financialization: President Reagan’s 
Privatization Commission Model 
Privatization drew the interest of President Reagan, as well, though 
on different terms crafted primarily around economic competitiveness 
as a driver of innovation and efficiency.  The President’s Commission 
on Privatization was created by Executive Order 12607 on September 
2, 1987.199  The Commission Report’s discussion of prison privatization 
opens with reference to prison crowding,200 but makes no mention of 
the Congressional legislation that established mandatory minimum 
sentences in 1984.  The section on prison privatization consists of eight 
recommendations supporting privatization as “effective and 
appropriate” for federal, state, and local governments.201  The 
Commission encourages experimentation and research involving 
contracting at the Bureau of Prisons and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, including the federal demonstration project202 
that a full ten years later—after much debate—yielded the Taft 
Correctional Institution.203 
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The President’s Commission report acknowledges criticisms of 
prison privatization, particularly with respect to the idea of corrections 
as a core governmental function appropriate for the public sector, as 
well as issues of liability and accountability.204  They dealt with these 
via assurances of experts.  Regarding standards, the Commission relied 
on the testimony of public and private corrections professionals, 
among others, to affirm that the standards of the American Corrections 
Association, as well as Constitutional and other legal requirements, 
could hold private corrections to appropriate performance.205  Liability 
could also be dealt with contractually.  Regarding accountability, their 
position was that “contract prison operations can add another layer of 
accountability” to corrections.206 
Overall, the section of the Commission report on prison 
privatization was almost wholly given over to the financialization of 
prison production, up to and including the ownership and operation of 
an entire prison and its operations.207  This emphasis is consistent with 
the priorities of the privatization movement, as discussed in previous 
sections.  We underscore this parallel as evidence of support for prison 
privatization independent of—and earlier than—the prison crowding 
crisis. 
3. The Task Force and the President’s Commission, Compared 
The labor orientation of the Chief Justice’s Task Force was focused 
primarily on internal reform of the corrections system, to eliminate 
abuses and improve the post-release prospects for inmates.  While the 
Task Force did not ignore the potential for relief of tax burdens with 
broader participation of the private sector, its principles and 
recommendations were largely devoted to reorganizing institutional 
structures, lines of communication and accountability, and system-
wide relationships—all aimed at improving a person’s life after release 
from prison. The Task Force dealt specifically with prison labor; its 
path mapped a terrain of labor reform.208  As noted above, Congress 
did not implement its full recommendations, particularly those most 
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immediately affecting the prisoner as worker—i.e., wages, hours, and 
the right to organize.  As also noted above, Congress adopted PIECP in 
1979, introducing privately owned factories into prisons as envisioned 
by the Task Force—a partial success. 
The President’s Commission, on the other hand, was concerned with 
privatization in general, very much along the lines of the privatization 
movement as articulated by the Heritage Foundation and the Reason 
Foundation, which continue to promote prison privatization in the 
context of broader reforms of government.209  The Commission report 
included prison privatization as one section among many.  In general, 
the Commission’s recommendations—in the prison context as well as 
others—mapped a terrain involving a new financialization of 
government, so as to better meet the challenges and opportunities of 
global economic competition, as defined by the Commission’s 
members. 
The financialization model—essentially aimed at reducing fixed 
costs (such as prisoner upkeep), maximizing economic efficiencies, 
and, where possible, expanding revenue streams—has become familiar 
to anyone who has been following public affairs in even the most 
casual way, given the dominance of that model in public policy since 
the late 1980s.  But the labor reform model is likely less familiar, given 
the extent to which minimum wage and collective bargaining remain 
points of controversy and resistance within the Congress and in many 
states.210  Thus, a comment like the following—the opening lines of the 
Chief Justice’s Task Force report—presents terms of debate that might 
be unfamiliar to readers whose experience of the privatization debate 
has been entirely in terms of competitiveness and efficiency: 
Public attention to prisons, the kinds of people in them, and the 
activities that take place “behind the walls” is at an 
unprecedented high level in our nation.  Perhaps at no other 
time in our history has such interest been manifested 
simultaneously by citizens and public and private leaders at 
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federal, state and local levels.  Of highest interest is the work 
inmates perform in prison, or prison industries.211 
The differences between these approaches remain unresolved 
within the federal government—debates over prison industries 
continuing to contend over wages and competitiveness, and debates 
over full privatization struggling over the monetization of 
incarceration rates, among other things. 
In conclusion to Part II, we have discussed two principal approaches 
to privatization that developed within the federal government over the 
course of the 1970s and 1980s.  The more recent program, PIE, 
emphasizes private enterprise production for consumption on the 
open market.  The older model, Federal Prison Industries/UNICOR, 
emphasizes prison enterprise within a market guaranteed by a 
mandatory sourcing rule as applied to government agencies.  Both 
models operate within public prisons, underscoring the extent to 
which prison privatization does not automatically distinguish private 
prisons from public ones, but links them through the prison labor 
context.  Prison labor has a far longer history than either of these 
modern initiatives, but we have emphasized these because of the 
insights they afford with respect to contemporary issues in prison 
privatization, bridging public and private prisons, and in relation to the 
broader significance of privatization in relation to the neoliberalization 
of global capital. 
CONCLUSION 
Our purpose in the previous sections has been to contribute to a 
reframing of the discussion of prison privatization by exploring its 
American formation in the privatization movement, particularly in 
relation to prison labor.  Part I reviewed privatization in the form of 
outsourcing as a mode of governance that is central to the 
contemporary ways in which government now operates.  In Part II, we 
explored the roots of prison privatization in relation to the 
privatization movement, as it was diversely taken up within the federal 
government.  We found that labor was the context in which 
privatization—for better or for worse—was first and most enduringly 
incorporated into the prison system.  Adjusting the chronology of 
modern prison privatization to correspond to the history of the 
privatization movement makes visible the extent to which the 
subsequent deepening of the prison crisis was—in terms of 
resources—at least in part a consequence of the application of the 
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financialization model to prison management, governmental 
budgeting, contracting, and monitoring.  That policy choice was well 
rehearsed (so to speak) in other areas of the government reshaped by 
neoliberalization.212 
Seen in light of this larger and more complex context, prison labor 
is—to a degree that might be surprising—continuous with the civilian 
labor force in its vulnerabilities to fluctuations in demand, pricing, 
social supports, and various forms of rights.213  Indeed, some 
proponents of prison industries have advocated for managing wages 
and barring union activity so as to maintain competitive advantage 
over the off-shore alternatives.  Debates over UNICOR highlight 
controversies over wages, collective bargaining, and free trade.214  
Debates over PIE highlight the narrow conditions under which U.S. 
labor is able to maintain a competitive advantage over offshore labor 
in the global marketplace.  Throughout this same period, minimum 
wage, benefits, protections, and the right to organize were subjects of 
debate with respect to the civilian labor force as well.  To this extent, 
we may look to prison labor to see what global competitive advantage 
looks like from domestic ground.   
From this standpoint, debates surrounding the privatization of 
inmate labor are of a piece with debates over wages, benefits, and 
collective bargaining outside of the prison context.  We emphasize the 
importance of this finding, as it suggests that the appropriate context 
for analyzing prison privatization cannot be set wholly within prison 
walls.  In particular, the issues of competition with the private sector 
and incentivizing firms to “insource”215 are reminders of the extent to 
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which inmate labor is—in these respects—a difference of degree, and 
not of kind, with civilian labor.  Wages, benefits, social security, and 
other protections, as well as the right to organize, are issues in political 
contention that affect the workforce at large.  Moreover, prisons are 
not the only context in which labor is highly constrained.  The 
maquiladoras of northern Mexico, the high-tech workshops of China, 
and other locations where offshore workers’ labor for U.S. firms in 
highly constrained living and working conditions, may be usefully 
compared to the inmate labor situation.216  Military prisons are also 
part of the FPI/UNICOR system, but beyond that specific connection, 
military work—as work—also invites productive comparisons.217 
This broader context suggests some limitations to approaching 
prison privatization primarily as a contrast with public prisons, 
beyond the fact that privatized labor spans both regimes.  To be sure, 
the conceptual distinction between public and private is of value 
philosophically in relation to the different accountabilities of 
government and business, to democracy, and to shareholders, 
respectively.  For this very reason, in more pragmatic terms, public and 
private values or interests may not be on the same spectrum, since 
government and private companies are held to different 
accountabilities and rationales; they are also subject to different 
formulations of success. 
The debates over prison labor underscore the extent to which 
“privatization” and “neoliberalism” are not monoliths, except perhaps 
in their most ideologically framed terms.  They are rubrics for diverse 
models and approaches, and as such, they are open to different values, 
expectations, and institutional norms.218  From this standpoint, 
standard keywords from the privatization movement and its critics—
binaries such as public/private and law/market, and monoliths such as 
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neoliberalism and globalization—do not do justice to the specifics 
associated with particular sectors of governmental or entrepreneurial 
activity, nor to the history by which financialization came to the fore as 
the prevailing policy concern.  Such binary approaches limit our 
imaginations when it comes to reforming prisons, both public and 
private.  The roads not taken—or paths that may yet emerge—become 
more visible once prison labor is taken into account.  Viewed as a 
workplace, corrections cannot be fully or automatically assimilated to 
private enterprise, given that inmates are required to work, and do not 
participate in setting the value of their own labor.  That said, 
constraints on the non-prison workforce in terms of choice in a 
precarious labor market are not of a wholly different order. 
Overall, refocusing discussion of prison privatization to include the 
wider relevance of prison labor underscores the constraints of a 
concept of privatization limited to financialization, and to prison 
privatization solely in terms of efficiencies in prison construction and 
management.  In what appears to be the prevailing model for federal 
and state prisoners, inmates are cost points to be mitigated by various 
strategies for minimizing costs, including their own contributions to 
revenue generation.  Financialization extends to contracts and 
monitoring as well, as private firms may be held to a certain capacity—
or as firms in turn hold the contracting state agency to maintaining a 
certain rate of capacity.219 
Our analysis points to the vital importance of contracts and 
monitoring as sites where prisoners’ wellbeing and post-release 
prospects can be protected in the private prison context.220  
The contracting process can be constructed in ways that enhance 
such prospects, as well as the democratic process surrounding 
corrections.  In this regard, a first and crucial step would be to 
acknowledge that private prisons involve a special form of 
procurement that requires more than regulation of the bidding process 
and conditions for payment.  Prisoners—human beings with human 
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needs—cannot reasonably be covered with the same sort of contract 
and contract processes that are used, for example, to construct a bridge 
or build a road.221  Non-marketized values are not easily expressed in 
contract form, and private providers are therefore unlikely to face 
checks—even with the most robust monitoring—if they are required 
only to cut costs so as to maintain profitability and shareholder value.  
Contracts for private prisons should be open to fully informed public 
debate, especially when it comes to advocating for provisions that 
might add additional protections and services for prisoners.222 
To this end, the public needs to be more fully involved when it 
comes to certain procedural and substantive contract provisions 
involving prisons.  Procedurally, the proposed contract itself should be 
made public, perhaps on the contacting agency’s own website, not 
unlike a proposed agency rule made available for comment.  What 
arrangements have been made for prison health care?  Such provisions 
should be made public before such decisions are made and members of 
the public should have a chance to comment on them.  More 
substantively, the comments might also include advocacy for the 
inclusion of certain provisions dealing with, for example, the 
enhancement of the educational opportunities for the prisoners 
involved, or specifically, what might be done to decrease the rates of 
recidivism overall?  What benchmarks and goals are written into these 
contracts that require such efforts? 
For the public to be effectively involved, information must be 
gathered and made public concerning the track records of those 
competing for these contracts, and information and monitoring must 
occur throughout the duration of the contract once it is awarded.  This 
may involve innovative forms of monitoring and information sharing.  
Contracts could, at a minimum, include liability rules that incentivize 
the private firms to carry out their responsibilities in a constitutionally 
appropriate way.  While it may be difficult at present for courts to hold 
private prison providers constitutionally liable for the negligent 
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behavior of prison guards,223 such liability rules can be spelled out in 
the contracts involved.  By negotiating for contractual provisions that 
extend liability for constitutional torts to the private corporations now 
managing prisons, stronger incentive for private providers to minimize 
the kinds of behavior that can adversely affect the health and wellbeing 
of prisoners would result.  Monitoring should also be public—including 
attention to human rights and fair labor standards.  To this end, the 
contracts might also include clauses designating the prisoners 
themselves as third party beneficiaries of these contracts, thereby 
authorizing them to sue if they believe its provisions have been 
breached.224  There should be no penalty against inmates who file legal 
complaints, even if their claim is subsequently dismissed or not 
granted. 
While the political mainstreaming of privatization has involved 
constant repetition of the mantra favoring markets over government 
as reflecting values of competition and individual liberty over 
constraints and state control, the relevance of privatization in the 
prison context has been more obviously in relation to developments 
elsewhere—trumping organized labor and sidestepping political 
opposition to government expenditures for social security and various 
forms of protection for workers in state legislatures and the Congress.  
Inmate laborers in this sense share very directly in the condition of the 
general labor force in their common sectors of industry, and improving 
their status as beneficiaries of their own labor cannot be separated 
from the parallel question on the other side of the prison walls.  A focus 
on their post-release integration highlights such parallels, as inmates 
face re-incorporation into workplaces as well as their families and 
communities.  The restoration of voting rights for prisoners should 
also be considered.225 
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Our analysis also implies that discussion of approaches to regulating 
prison privatization should not be focused solely on prisons per se, but 
should also extend to privatization and outsourcing more generally, 
and to the social security of underserved communities, including labor 
security.  This may mean developing a new approach to regulation—
one that is more open to due process and democratic participation—to 
ensure maximum fairness for inmates, together with their 
communities, whatever the entity may be that carries out the public’s 
charge.  Our goal in this analysis has been to suggest the extent to 
which private prisons belong to a larger set of trends by which 
collective forms of social responsibility—whether for prisoners or 
others—has been increasingly placed by the government into the 
hands of private firms along lines consistent with prevailing forms of 
neoliberal capitalism.  In the prison labor context, this has resulted in a 
paradoxical situation in which the advantages claimed for privatization 
cannot be achieved without legislative supports of various kinds—to 
make work a requirement, suppress wages, and manipulate market 
competition.  Appreciating privatization in relation to globalization 
draws attention to the wider significance of that paradox—and, we 
hope, to the relevance of rethinking the limits of privatization for all of 
us, from the prisoners’ side of the wall. 
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